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
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MOLOTOV'S SPEECHES

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at the

1946

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

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
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at the

1946

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE



*Plenary Session of the Peace Conference
held in the Luxembourg Palace, Paris*

D. J. Ruggmann /

Larkin

November 1946 /

USSR at the PARIS
PEACE CONFERENCE

(July-October, 1946)

SPEECHES OF
V. M. MOLOTOV

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
and Head of the Soviet Delegation at the
Conference

(FULL TEXT)

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FIRST SPEECH

at the Plenary Session, July 31, 1946

PERMIT me to greet the Peace Conference on behalf of the Soviet Union, and to wish the Conference delegates success in their great and responsible work. The Soviet Delegation expresses especial appreciation to the hospitable French Government and the friendly people of France.

The present Conference must play an important part in establishing peace and security in Europe. It will have to express its opinion and to offer its recommendations on drafts of peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. One might say that the Paris Conference has to accomplish the tasks of five peace conferences, which emphasises the importance and complexity of its work. We are dealing with five countries which entered the war as Germany's allies, as Hitler's satellites, but in the course of the war broke with Germany, overthrew their Fascist rulers and, as a rule, came out actively on the side of the democratic countries in the war for victory over Hitlerite Germany.

All of us will remember the course of events as they developed before our eyes during the last war in Europe, and this will help us to give a correct answer to the question of securing a just, stable and lasting peace for the future.

Justice requires, in the first place, that we should genuinely take account of the interests of the countries which were subjected to invasion and suffered as a result of aggression. The Soviet Union, which itself became the object of attack from various directions and bore the exceptionally heavy burden of invasion by the Fascist hordes of Germany, as well as those of Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Finland, deeply sympathises with all nations which suffered from aggression.

From this platform the Soviet Union again greets the peoples of the Allied countries who waged a self-sacrificing struggle against our common enemies, and expresses its unshakable desire to render them support in their just demands for the punishment of war criminals, for compensation for damage inflicted on them, for the establishment of a just peace. The Soviet Union cannot regard its obligations to its Allies in any other way.

It should be clear to us that the countries which launched the attack and fought in alliance with Germany should bear responsibility for the crimes of their ruling circles. Aggression and invasion of foreign countries should not go unpunished, if we really seek to prevent new aggressions and invasions. In

such cases impunity, and refusal to protect the legitimate rights of the States which suffered from aggression, have nothing in common with the interests of a just and lasting peace, but can only play into the hands of those who are preparing new aggressions in their predatory imperialistic interests.

The Soviet Union is one of those countries which works consistently to establish the stable peace and security of the nations. This determines the attitude of the Soviet Government in regard to the peace treaties with Germany's former satellites. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. reckons fully with the fact that, as a result of democratic transformations, the countries which had been allied to Hitlerite Germany took a new path, in the last period of the war, and in some cases rendered the Allied States considerable help in fighting for the complete elimination of the German aggressor. That is why the Soviet Union recognises that these States should compensate the damage they caused, not in full, but only in part, to a definite and limited extent.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union maintains a negative attitude towards all attempts to impose upon Germany's former satellites outside intervention of various kinds in their economic life, and rejects such demands on these countries and such pressure on these nations as would be incompatible with their State sovereignty and national dignity. It is not difficult to appreciate this when perusing the texts of the Armistice Agreements for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, which were published in full directly they were signed.

During the past period, on the initiative of the Soviet Government, the terms of the Armistice Agreements were mitigated on a number of occasions, which is explained by a desire to facilitate, for these countries, the transition to economic and general national revival after the war. The peace treaties with these countries should also be based on this principle. It was not accidental that Germany's former satellites proved to be countries of a Fascist and semi-Fascist type. It is well known that Mussolini's Italy was part of Hitler's Axis. Rumania and Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland found themselves in the hands of Hitler's agents, who drew these States into war against the democratic countries.

The Second World War was unleashed by Fascism, and came to an end only when Fascism had been broken and defeated. Now we know that in our times Fascism and aggression have become inseparable. In view of this it is logical that all peace treaties submitted to the Conference should especially stress the necessity of preventing a revival of Fascism and of consolidating the foundations of democracy in States which had been German satellites. In this respect the peace treaties of our times differ

substantially from the peace treaties formulated after the First World War—which is perfectly comprehensible.

It was also comprehensible that the declaration on liberated Europe adopted at the Crimea Conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers—Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union—should specially emphasise the “necessity to destroy the last traces of Nazism and Fascism” and to afford the liberated nations the opportunity to create democratic institutions of their own choice.

Stable peace and security cannot be assured unless the last remnants of Fascism, which kindled the Second World War, are destroyed. If, however, we still have to deal with the problem of the Fascist regime in Spain, the time should not be far off when the democratic countries will be able to help the Spanish people, now groaning under the Franco regime, to put an end to this survival, the creation of Hitler and Mussolini, which endangers the cause of peace. In any case, the interests of all peace-loving nations demand that we carry to a conclusion the struggle against Fascism, which is the most dangerous aggressor in our times.

The drafts of the five peace treaties have been submitted to the present Conference. These drafts were prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers in conformity with the well-known special decision on this subject. As is known, the Council of Foreign Ministers was set up at the Berlin Conference last year on the initiative of the United States of America. The Soviet Government, for its part, favoured this proposal from the very outset. Moreover, the Soviet Government always recognised that the undeviating and precise implementation of this decision should be regarded not merely as a formal duty of the Governments concerned, but as an essential prerequisite of the success of the work of this Council.

It is rightly said that the big States should not impose their will on small countries, but this equally applies when powerful States attempt to impose their will on some other big State.

Germany's example shows what menace is contained in the unrestrained imperialist striving to commit acts of violence against other nations, and towards world supremacy. On the other hand, the democratic countries know the methods of co-operation which yielded positive results during the war, as well as afterwards. The Council of Foreign Ministers was created for the very purpose of solving problems not by imposing the will of some States upon other States, but by working out joint decisions and actions.

From the example of the drafting the peace treaties we can see that the Council of Foreign Ministers has achieved

definite positive results. We can state this, although we are not at all inclined to think that these drafts reflect fully enough the just aspirations of the Allied peoples. At the same time, however, one cannot ignore the fact that nowadays the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers are not infrequently attacked by all kinds of reactionary elements, stuffed with absurd anti-Soviet prejudices, and building their calculations on the disruption of Great-Power co-operation.

The drafts of the peace treaties submitted to the Conference deal a fresh blow to the efforts of these gentlemen. It is enough to read the proposals contained in the drafts to realise that the democratic countries which prepared them have in essence met the interests of the big and small countries seeking to strengthen general peace and the security of the nations.

The Conference will have the opportunity to engage in broad discussion of all problems of the peace treaties. Equal delegations representing 21 States are present at our Conference.

Everyone of us here can freely formulate his opinion and express his agreement or disagreement with any part of any peace treaty. It has been ensured that any such expression of view will be listened to with due respect; moreover, it will be of considerable assistance during the final examination of the draft treaties.

The opinions of the States which were Germany's satellites will also be heard here. The Soviet Delegation does not doubt that all of us will listen to the voice of these States, too, with due attention. As a Soviet delegate I have all the more reason to say this, because the Soviet Union has established friendly relations with these countries since they broke with the enemy camp, came out against Hitlerism and took the path of democratic transformation and social reform in the interests of the masses of the people. All this gives us ground to hope for the real success of the work of the Conference in the interests of all peace-loving nations.

II.

SPEECH AT THE COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE

July 31, 1946

(Morning Session)

THE procedure that will govern the work of the Conference is now under discussion here. In this connection, we cannot but be interested in the available precedents. Let us, for example, consider the Versailles Conference. What was the procedure at this Conference? It is clear from the documents that, at Versailles, the procedure, far from being approved, was not even referred to the Conference for consideration. Such

were the rules governing the work of the Peace Conference after the First World War.

What was the situation at the San Francisco Conference? With the consent of the 51 States who took part, it was decided that the proposals presented by the Four Powers to this Conference in the shape of the draft Charter of the United Nations were to be revised if amendments were passed by a two-thirds majority. This rule was in operation throughout the San Francisco Conference, and helped to organise its work correctly.

The opinion has here been expressed that if we accept the principle of a two-thirds majority at the present Conference, this might lead to a situation in which no recommendations would be adopted. Such an assertion could be made only by one endowed with the power of prophecy, or by a fortune-teller, or by one who has some special reasons for making it, of which we are not fully aware. In any case there is not sufficient basis for such a prophecy, surmise or conjecture.

The San Francisco Conference was guided by the two-thirds majority principle in passing its decisions. Were the recommendations passed at San Francisco so few? No—there were plenty of them. There is no ground whatever for expecting that the proposal made by the Council of Foreign Ministers, concerning the adoption of decisions by a two-thirds majority, will endanger the adoption of recommendations by the Conference.

When people say, as the Australian delegate Dr. Evatt has said, that we should adhere to the principle of three-fifths of the votes—which is quite unusual—instead of two-thirds, we are conscious here of a knowledge of arithmetic, of precise calculation, and also of some other considerations of which all delegates are not fully aware, because they have not been fully expounded by the author of the calculations.

I am speaking in defence of the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the subject of procedure. I do not think, however, that I shall be alone in defending the decision adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Delegation takes a serious view of the problem of voting at the Conference and in the Committees which will be set up, and it believes that a qualified majority has a greater weight in passing decisions on important questions at the Conference or in the Committees. It would be difficult to persuade anyone that in passing decisions at important conferences a qualified majority has less weight and prestige than a simple majority. It would sound strange if anyone tried to prove that a decision taken, let us say, by 11 votes against 10 is better than one taken by 14 votes against seven. It would be difficult

to persuade anyone of this, who approaches the subject objectively.

What have we to fear, when we come to examine the important problems at the Conference? We should treat things soberly, and we must forestall methods which are called "playing with votes." We should prevent it, in order to maintain the prestige of the Conference and the significance of the decisions which it will take.

Indeed, let us take an example known to everyone of us. We are discussing five peace treaties and, properly speaking, we have here five peace conferences united in one conference. Now, consider the problem of Finland. It is known that of 21 States, only 10 were in a state of war with Finland, while 11 States were not in a state of war with her. Under such circumstances, can we seriously take a decision when some recommendations concerning the peace treaty with Finland may be adopted by a majority of 11 votes cast by countries which were not in a state of war with Finland?

What, properly speaking, would be the result of such voting? It would be "playing with votes" and discrediting the Conference. Such a situation is of course little probable, but when people are carried away by the game of playing with votes, they may be led into an impasse. Is that in the interest of the Conference?

One might cite another instance. We should watch how the work of the Conference is reflected in international public opinion. For instance, how do certain quite influential organs of the Paris Press treat the problems which we are now discussing—problems of procedure? The Socialist newspaper *Populaire* announced to-day: "As is well-known, the four Foreign Ministers proposed that decisions on procedure be passed by a simple majority, and on main problems by a two-thirds majority. The latter condition naturally places the Anglo-Saxons at a disadvantage, as together with their client States they form a bloc possessing 12 or 13 votes. Were all the decisions to be taken by simple majority votes, the failure of the Soviet Union would be assured on almost every occasion." This is how public opinion in France interprets our discussion of procedure.

That is only one comment on our discussion. The newspaper may be less exact than the calculations of Dr. Evatt, who is a participant in the Conference, and has his own voting arithmetic. We do not know whether the author of the comment in *Populaire* is present at the Conference, but he has already estimated that 12 or 13 votes constitute a definite bloc. The calculations of *Populaire* correspond exactly to the arithmetic

of Dr. Evatt. In that case a majority of the Conference is being opposed, in advance, to a minority.

Now it will clear to us why a two-thirds majority is unacceptable to Dr. Evatt, and why a three-fifths majority, which means 13 votes out of 21, suits him. It is not difficult to see that these are back-stage calculations of advantages to be derived from a definite combination of votes at the Conference. Such combinations do not correspond to the interests of the Conference. They do not reflect concern for the prestige of the Conference. But they do meet the interests of a group of delegates forming a bloc.

The Conference should not agree to this playing with votes. The Conference is interested in something different. It is in its interests that the Delegations representing 21 States do not become somebody's instrument in a game of votes, but that it should prepare its recommendations, expressing its view authoritatively. We should decline to set 12 or 13 votes against the other votes at this Conference, and should not permit any playing with votes, because such combinations cannot express the will of the peoples which the Conference should represent.

We should see to it that the prestige of the Conference is not undermined, and that it gives effect to the desire of the peoples to help in the establishment of a stable peace and in elaborating treaties which correspond to the aims of the Allied States, and enjoy the support of international public opinion.

That is why I believe that the well-considered and closely-studied decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers on procedure, which have been put before the Conference, could be taken as a basis. They could serve to improve the organisation of the entire work of the Conference. We must reject every attempt at playing with votes, and see to it that our decisions are adopted in concert, are sufficiently weighty, and exercise a beneficial influence on the final formulation of the peace treaties.

III.

SECOND SPEECH AT THE COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE

August 5, 1946

(Evening Session)

THE Soviet delegation thought it necessary to listen to most of the delegates before making its own observations. The representative of the Union of South Africa, who spoke here first, began his speech with the statement that we are now discussing a question of exceptional importance. This put the Soviet delegation on the alert, in order the more clearly to understand the motives behind such statements.

We are discussing the question of how we should vote at the Conference—by simple majority or by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes. We are thus discussing the question as to who should have the right to speak on behalf of our Conference and to adopt recommendations.

At the same time we are certainly interested in the weight of these recommendations. If the recommendations of the Conference are adopted by a majority of two-thirds rather than a simple majority, it is clear to everyone that its recommendations will carry more weight. It is clear that when the Council of Foreign Ministers takes final decisions as envisaged by the Moscow Conference, then recommendations adopted by a two-thirds vote will be of greater significance than those adopted by a simple majority. Is it not obvious that recommendations adopted by eleven votes to ten carry less weight than those adopted by fourteen votes to seven?

Again, let us turn to international practice. We may take the example of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. There all decisions except those on procedure are to be passed by a two-thirds majority. This was not an accidental decision. It was passed with the consent of 51 nations. We know the experience of the San Francisco Conference, which is the most immediate example before us. It is known that at this Conference decisions were passed by a majority of two-thirds and not by simple majority. The San Francisco Conference also decided that the Committees discussing amendments to the draft submitted by the four Powers could accept these amendments only by a two-thirds vote and not by a simple majority.

Such is the example of the San Francisco Conference of 51 nations. Why should we not adhere to the same voting procedure, which has yielded good results? The Dutch delegation here moved an amendment suggesting the rejection of the Council of Ministers' proposal for the adoption of recommendations by two-thirds of the votes of the Conference delegates. I have already objected to this amendment. However, in the course of the work of our Committee a new amendment was proposed by the British delegation.

It does not require long argument to prove that this amendment upsets the decision passed by the four Ministers' Council. It is not difficult to see that in essence the British amendment does not differ from the Dutch amendment, which is also aimed at upsetting and destroying the proposal of the four Ministers' Council.

See what the British delegation's amendment leads to. Three weeks ago in the four Ministers' Council the British, American, French and Soviet delegates found it necessary to advise the Conference to adopt its recommendations by a majority of

two-thirds of the votes. Today, however, the British representative proposes that the Conference should adopt recommendations both by a two-thirds majority and by a simple majority. But this is exactly the amendment of the Dutch delegation, which seeks to upset the decision of the four Ministers' Council.

The Soviet delegation regards the British delegation's amendment as unacceptable because it destroys the decision for which we voted in the four Ministers' Council, for which the British delegation voted along with the three others. If the British delegate deems it possible to speak in the four Ministers' Council in favour of voting by a two-thirds majority at the Conference, while at the Conference itself he comes out with a proposal to vote by simple majority, that is his right. We cannot restrict or criticise his powers. But we can note here that his one stand contradicts the other, that the one destroys the other, that the latter is incompatible with the former.

Mr. Byrnes came out today with the view that on matters of procedure the American delegation is not bound by the voting in which it took part in the four Ministers' Council. But if today a delegation is not bound by its former voting on matters of procedure, why cannot this serve tomorrow as a precedent for some other delegation—though not on matters of procedure this time?

After all, it is open to anyone to hold a certain opinion today and arrive at a different opinion tomorrow. This is the right of every delegation. We cannot, however, pass by the fact that one contradicts the other and one destroys the other. Here, too, a contradiction between the stand taken in the four Ministers' Council and at the Conference is obvious. Such are the facts.

It has been rightly pointed out today that the draft peace treaties contain a whole list of problems on which agreement has not been reached. Every one of the four Ministers reserved his own opinion on these problems, and every one of them will vote on these problems in the way he finds necessary. Clearly, when we discuss a new question, which was not discussed in the Council of Ministers and is raised here by some delegate who did not take part in that Council, the four Ministers have their hands free. I believe, however, that as regards questions on which a certain opinion was agreed upon in the four Ministers' Council, there exists a certain moral responsibility for the participant in the agreed proposal.

In any case, here is what the Soviet delegation thinks on this point: if in the four Ministers' Council the Soviet delegate voted for some proposal agreed with the three other Ministers, then the Soviet delegate will also cast his vote for the same

proposal at the Conference. This is what we regard as being consistent. A different viewpoint may have any other quality, but it cannot be called consistent.

Mr. Byrnes stated today that he supported the proposal moved by the Canadian delegate at the Conference concerning the desirability of convening the four Ministers' Council during the work of the Conference. This is good. I must say that as far back as July 30, the Soviet delegation proposed to the American delegation an agreement on the convocation of the Council of the four Ministers. Our proposal was rejected. We were told that in the opinion of the American delegation the four Ministers' Council should not meet after the beginning of the Peace Conference. One cannot, however, help being surprised by the fact that when this proposal was advanced by the Soviet delegation it was found unacceptable, but when the same proposal was moved by the Canadian delegation it was found acceptable by Mr. Byrnes.

What is the actual meaning of the question we are now discussing? I will remind you of the statement of the South African delegate, who said that we are discussing a matter of exceptional importance. I am prepared to agree with this opinion. This is why we should remember that world public opinion is closely watching our discussion of this problem, our approach to the examination of this problem, our manner of making proposals on this problem and our aims in discussing it.

How does public opinion interpret the discussion on voting procedure at our Conference? I will recall the statement of the French Socialist newspaper *Populaire* which wrote: "As is well-known, the four Foreign Ministers proposed that decisions on procedure be passed by a simple majority and on main problems by a two-thirds majority. The latter condition naturally places the Anglo-Saxons at a disadvantage, as together with their client States they form a bloc possessing twelve or thirteen votes. Were all decisions to be taken by simple majority votes, the failure of the Soviet Union would be assured on almost every occasion."

This is how public opinion interprets our present discussion when we are debating whether we should accept the principle of simple majority or the principle of two-thirds majority in the Conference voting. I will not argue that the newspaper counted the votes at the Conference with perfect precision, yet I will not close my eyes to the fact that there is a grain of truth in its statement. And it is not accidental that if you read the French, American, British and Soviet press or the press of other countries, you will find quite a number of utterances similar to those of *Populaire*.

Indeed if, as *Populaire* says, the Anglo-Saxon bloc has twelve or thirteen reliable votes at this Conference, then acceptance of a simple majority of eleven votes is very convenient for this particular group. This group need not then work very hard to persuade anyone of the correctness of its views. It just has to do a bit of mobilising and a minimum of twelve votes will accomplish what they are required to do. Thus, this group can guarantee the adoption of any proposal at the Conference, even though it is absolutely unacceptable to nearly half the delegates.

Of course, if one has even twelve votes and not thirteen, when only eleven votes are needed for a simple majority, then why exert oneself to persuade somebody, why prove the correctness of one's proposal, why prove that this or some other proposal is really well-founded? It so happened, however, that when the Council of Foreign Ministers proposed that the recommendations of the Conference be passed by a two-thirds majority and not by a simple majority, there arose a complication. To have a recommendation accepted by a two-thirds vote, fourteen votes are needed. When one has only twelve or thirteen, one or two votes are lacking. Evidently, this one or maybe two missing votes was the cause of so many objections against the two-thirds majority recommended by the four Ministers' Council.

The South African delegate said the question under discussion was one of exceptional importance. Public opinion, however, gets the impression that what matters is one missing vote for the group which the *Populaire* calls the Anglo-Saxon bloc—it appears to have twelve or thirteen votes, and one vote is lacking to secure a two-thirds majority. How, then, can one agree to a two-thirds majority if one vote is lacking?

This is what the situation looks like if we adopt a group policy instead of striving to make our decisions as far as possible unanimous. This is what the "playing with votes" leads to. This is evidently how public opinion interprets the situation which was frankly described by *Populaire*, and not by that newspaper alone. For the overwhelming majority of the people who represent democratic public opinion this path will be incomprehensible and wholly unacceptable. Instead of a "playing with votes," impermissible in a democratic world, let us face the facts.

There are nine countries that suffered most from attacks by Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, nine countries invaded by enemy troops of the above States. I will enumerate them: the three Soviet States represented here, then France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece and Ethiopia. These are nine States whose territories were invaded by troops

of one or another of the States for which we are now drafting peace treaties. You understand what may happen if recommendations are adopted here by a simple majority. It may happen that these nine countries find themselves in a minority although they suffered most of all, although they bore the heaviest burden on their shoulders, although they have the right to be listened to with special attention at this Conference.

If decisions are taken by a simple majority, these countries may be simply isolated. If twelve States should vote against nine, all these States most interested in the given peace treaty may find themselves in a minority and still the recommendations will be adopted. What, then, will be the value of such recommendations in the eyes of world public opinion? Whereas if a two-thirds majority is accepted, this cannot happen.

We must agree that even if we accept the proposal for a simple majority vote there may arise such a "playing with votes" as, far from enhancing the prestige of the Conference, may lead to very unfavourable political results. That is why when it is said here that the question we are discussing is of extreme significance, we should not merely think of how we shall vote—in one combination of votes or in a different combination. We should reckon with the political consequences of this voting. The Peace Conference should serve the interests of peace and not something else. We would seek to obtain a situation whereby decisions on important questions, in particular on the principle of voting at the Conference, are dictated by the interests of peace based on the future consolidation of unity amongst Allies, at least amongst those who were Allies during the war and who honestly wish to be in the same democratic camp during peace.

It is unnecessary to conceal that differences do exist among us. The American delegate was right in pointing out that 26 questions not yet agreed upon remain in the peace treaties alone. Hence we are facing a rather big job in the discussions on these questions. There will also be quite a few new questions which we shall have to examine.

But look what happens. Even decisions which were agreed in the four Ministers' Council, as, for instance those dealing with the question of procedure, are being upset by certain members of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Even questions upon which we were agreed, and had arrived at agreed opinions after long discussion, even as regards these questions things are not quite smooth and these very decisions do not stand firmly on their feet.

It still seems to some of the delegates that if recommendations at the Conference are adopted by a majority of two-thirds and not by a simple majority, all possible differences will not be revealed at the Conference, and the Conference will have few

points of divergence with the Council of Foreign Ministers. This, however, can lead to one conclusion only: that one should look for a rift among the Foreign Ministers, try to creep into it and widen this rift. This is what "playing with votes" leads to. Is that what we want? Let us hope that none of us is interested in it and none of us wishes it.

We should remember that if, after the hardest of wars, our purpose is to contribute to the cause of peace, not only in words but in deeds, then we should be as unanimous as possible in this matter. If we wish to take into account the nations on whose behalf we are speaking, we should think not of "playing with votes" at the cost of the interests of peace, but of the real interests of peace.

Of course, there are those at the present time who speculate on a new war. There are adventurers who proclaim the preparation of a third world war to be their purpose. Yes, there exist such miserable, puny people. They are degenerates of their nations. In any event, they are people isolated from their nations, not to speak of the fact that their adventurist aspirations and their chatter about a third world war contradict the aspirations of all the peace-loving peoples. That is why, discussing here the best ways of organising the work of the Peace Conference, we should concern ourselves in the first place with the interests of peace, so that our decisions and the entire procedure of our work shall contribute to the interests of peace and to the consolidation of our unity. All those who speculate on a new world war should be put in their proper place in the pillory and be completely isolated in the eyes of the whole world.

Setting before ourselves these high aims, being concerned with securing a firm and lasting peace on the basis of the consolidation of unanimity among the democratic States, the Soviet delegation is in favour of our deciding upon a voting procedure at this Conference such as will correspond with this aim, the aim of the consolidation of unanimity at our Conference. It should be remembered that "playing with votes" may lead to playing with the interests of peace, which we should not permit.

The Soviet delegation has listened attentively to the observations made here and thinks it necessary to take into account the considerations that have been voiced. In view of this, the Soviet delegation proposes an addition to the decision passed by the Council of Ministers. Here is this addition:—

"If the recommendation proposed fails to receive two-thirds of the votes, the States which voted for this proposal may refer it to the Council of Ministers in which the said proposal will be given consideration."

This means that recommendations to be put forward in the name of the Conference should be adopted by two-thirds of the votes, but that the views which receive less than two-thirds of the votes should also be heard in the Council of Foreign Ministers as the views of the States concerned.

It would be highly desirable if this proposal could unite us. This would meet the interest of our Conference and of the consolidation of peace.

IV.

REPLY TO THE SPEECH OF MR. BYRNES AT THE COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE

August 6, 1946

1. *The Conference and the Council of Foreign Ministers*

MR. BYRNES' speech was militant and somewhat angry. I believe that the best way of replying to a speech of this kind will be to refer to facts. Then we shall be able to study the situation and to judge it calmly and objectively.

Mr. Byrnes said that beginning with Potsdam the Soviet Government has always sought to restrict in some manner the participation of other countries in the examination of international problems. In reply I shall cite facts.

I will remind you that the proposal to form the Council of Foreign Ministers which is an important organ of international activities, was made at Potsdam by the American delegation. The composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers was accepted exactly as was proposed by Mr. Byrnes, and during all this time no one has proposed any expansion of this body, which to my mind is quite understandable.

It is said, however, that the Soviet Union advocated the excessive limitation of the number of participants in the Peace Conference. Indeed, a proposal was made on this question which defined more precisely the composition of the Conference. We agreed quite easily that 21 States should be represented at the present Conference. World public opinion also approved of this decision. What, then, is Mr. Byrnes after when he tries to blame the Soviet delegation for the excessively restricted composition of the Peace Conference?

True, a broader composition of the Peace Conference was also proposed: it was to comprise representatives of practically all the States which declared war. Then it would have been necessary to supplement the list of 21 States by States which had at some time proclaimed a state of war with Italy, such as Haiti, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Salvador, the Philippines.

I have enumerated ten countries. There are some more countries in this group.

Of course there would have been more participants of the Conference if the representatives of at least these ten states had been additionally included. Then, perhaps, in adopting the voting procedure they would agree to two-thirds and even to three-quarters. I must admit, however, that the Soviet delegation has never considered proposals of this kind for the expansion of the present Conference as being ideal. And at the present Conference, by the way, no one has expressed regret in connection with the number of its participants.

There is another question—that of convening sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers during the Conference. What are the facts? The Soviet delegation proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should meet, among other things, for an exchange of views on the election of the chairman of our Committee. Is there anything in this that would hinder the work of the Conference or that of our Committee?

It is said that in the four Ministers' Council the Soviet delegation insisted on a preliminary discussion of the main questions of procedure. This was indeed so, and the other three Ministers agreed to it. Some rules of procedure were worked out and submitted for your consideration. Yet even on those rules of procedure which were worked out we have been talking and talking for more than a week and we still cannot get to the main questions of the Conference. And what would have happened if those rules were not worked out at all? Then we would need much more time for discussion of the rules of procedure.

Is it right to say that the rules of procedure proposed by the Council of four Ministers are some kind of dictate, as was stated here? Certainly not. This is a normal method of work and of international co-operation. When we proposed the convocation of the four Ministers' Council during the Conference, we regarded and still regard this proposal as justified and useful both for the Conference and for those Ministers who prepared it. If our proposal to discuss certain questions of the Conference was unacceptable to the American or any other delegation, they could have proposed that the four Ministers' Council should have been convened in order to discuss some other questions of the Conference—yet this was not done.

It required Mr. King's speech at the Conference to recall that a Council of Foreign Ministers does exist, that it is not deprived of the right of meeting or of the right to exchange views on matters arising before the Conference. I repeat that in my opinion it is useful for the Council of Ministers to meet during the Conference.

2. *The Question of Procedure and the Facts*

Mr. Byrnes further said that the rules of procedure were adopted in the four Ministers' Council with certain reservations on the part of individual Ministers. Nevertheless, Messrs. Delegates, you received the draft rules of procedure even before the beginning of the Conference. Thus you had to deal with definite proposals of the Council of four Ministers.

I note that the unanimity of the four Ministers on questions of procedure lasted until the beginning of the Conference. But as soon as a debate was opened at the Committee of the Conference, they recalled various reservations made during the preliminary stage of discussion.

Facts remain facts. A proposal on procedure was made by the four Ministers as a unanimous proposal, yet at the Conference one pulls one way and the other pulls another. Only the Soviet and French delegations continued to defend the agreed proposal on procedure. As to the American and British delegates, they recalled reservations they had made before the procedure was adopted. A somewhat ambiguous situation arises: they agreed with a proposal on procedure, and nevertheless they believe themselves entitled to speak against this procedure. I refuse to say whether this is consistent or not. Judge for yourselves on the basis of the facts.

It is said that the Soviet delegation itself proposed an amendment to the rules of procedure on the subject of voting. Indeed, after the British and American delegations had proposed their amendments to the voting rules, and only after that, we did make a proposal—but this is one of a kind that is self-understood and by no means upsets agreed decisions. Nevertheless, if there are objections to it, we do not impose it on anyone and are prepared to consider it and to agree how matters can best be arranged.

In any case it is by no means the purpose of our proposal to upset decisions taken jointly. The purpose of the Soviet delegation is not to allow the destruction of joint decisions. Therefore we propose no amendments on the subject of the recommendations, that is, on the question on which there exists an agreed opinion of the four Ministers.

But when we are told that at the Conference there also arise new problems or amendments which have not been discussed previously and in regard to which the four Ministers are therefore not bound by a preliminary decision, we agree that it is necessary to discuss them in the ordinary way.

Mr. Byrnes stated at the four Ministers' Council that he intended to propose that representatives of the press should have wide access to the Conference and to its Committees.

The Council of four Ministers did not record any opinion of its own on this problem, mainly because the question was clear. When Mr. Byrnes made this proposal here he was supported by all of us, and the decision was taken in a very simple manner. In this, as well as in other questions on which no proposals previously agreed among the four Ministers have been submitted to the Conference, the Ministers are not restricted by preliminary decisions in making their own proposals.

The Soviet delegation listens most attentively to the opinions of all delegates at the Conference. The Soviet delegation is prepared to consider attentively everything that may prove useful for improving the work of the Conference and does not contradict agreed decisions, provided it conforms to the aims of the Conference and to the interests of the cause of peace.

Dr. Evatt said here that it should be stated frankly that if the rule of two-thirds majority were adopted, then the Conference would not be able to pass any decision with which the Soviet Union disagreed. We may thank Dr. Evatt for his frankness. True, his statement seems to me unfounded. However, if anybody desires to push through some decisions against the Soviet Union and is looking for ways of facilitating this task, certainly we cannot help him in this respect. We believe no good will come of it.

It would be more correct to pose questions openly, to try to prove the correctness of one's proposals and as far as possible to convince all delegates, and not some kindred group or other. We have adhered to this method heretofore and will adhere to it further.

I shall not dwell on Mr. Byrnes' speech in every detail, but I must say that this is not the first time that the Soviet delegation finds itself in a position where yesterday we adopted a decision agreed with other governments, while to-day we have to defend this decision practically alone. We have quite a few instances of this kind.

We do not conceal from anybody that we are seeking to ensure concordant work on the part of the governments which adopt agreed decisions. This is by no means in our interests alone, not only in the interests of the U.S.S.R. We believe that other governments which took part in taking agreed decisions are also interested in this. More than that, we believe that the representatives of all the 21 states present here, as well as other states which desire a stable and lasting peace, are interested in concord among the great Powers. Only then shall we be able to draw the appropriate lessons from the war which we have just passed through, as well as useful lessons from the policies of governments of the period which preceded the war

and which led to the Second World War. These lessons should not be lost on us.

One should not strive to gain some advantage at a given moment from a combination of votes at some or other meeting, but one should regard it as one's duty to support agreed decisions not only in words but in deeds, and to learn to work together in order to contribute to the success of the Peace Conference and to the consolidation of peace. We hope that that no one will object to this; for our part, as far as necessary, we do not decline the honour of defending this policy more firmly, consistently and constantly.

If sometimes we see vacillation and attempts to depart from agreed decisions—and this is now a not infrequent occurrence—we still believe that in the process of work we shall learn to work together in the manner expected by those whom we represent and by public opinion in the democratic countries.

3. What is Lacking in the American and British Press

And lastly, Mr. Byrnes insisted in a kind of challenging tone, that his speech be published in the Soviet press. In doing so he referred to the fact that Molotov's speech of yesterday has already been published in the American press. But here before me is to-day's issue of the American newspaper *New York Herald-Tribune*. It does not contain my speech. The statement that the American press has published my speech does not correspond to facts. Yet this newspaper has already extensively criticised that speech and, as we see, did so before publishing the speech itself.

Does Mr. Byrnes propose that Soviet newspapers act on the principle of this kind of reciprocity in publishing his speech? If we are to act on the basis of reciprocity, we must advise the Soviet press to publish criticism of Mr. Byrnes' speech without publishing the speech itself.

Of course this would be wrong. The Soviet delegation is of a different opinion. We accept Mr. Byrnes' proposal. We shall publish his speech, and may the Soviet people read this speech just as we have heard it here. But when it is proclaimed here by some that, if you please, their press is free, and that everything about it is splendid, some perfectly legitimate questions are likely to arise. Quite enough material is available to give a correct description of the leading American press. We can refer, for instance, to the book "These Are the Facts," by the American writer George Seldes, and to a number of other books in which one can find not a little that is useful on this subject.

However, there also arise questions like the following: Are there not very rich newspaper trusts in America which own

important American press organs? Have not many of us heard that in the United States, alongside objective organs of the press, there exist powerful monopolies controlling the journals with the biggest circulation which heavily standardise and set the tone of the political information contained in American newspapers? Have we not heard of these powerful trusts, these powerful monopolies, of two or three virtual bosses of the American press?

Dealing with the British press, which in some respects not infrequently resembles the American press, I shall refer to the recently published statement of one of the most prominent British public men and to his description of the situation in this field. I have in mind the statement made to Reuters by the British Attorney-General. Sir Hartley Shawcross, who recently returned from Nuremberg and stated on July 30 that every newspaper in Britain should publish on its front page the statement: "This paper is owned by Lord So-and-So. Its object is to make commercial profit and to express the personal opinions which his lordship is pleased to hold from time to time. No guarantee is given that the facts reported in it are the truth or the whole truth; they may be anything but the truth."

Sir Hartley Shawcross added: "I fear that the suggestion will not commend itself." Shawcross also stated: "What I condemn . . . is what is in fact now occurring in a notorious section of the Tory press—special selection or misrepresentation of facts to suit opinions, the expression of opinions disguised as facts. I think that these things do seriously impede our democratic machinery of government. The important thing in modern democracy is that it should be based on informed opinions. And the existence of informed opinions depends largely not only on a free press but on an objective, honest press."

As you see, Sir Hartley Shawcross is longing for an objective and honest press in England, and one cannot help sympathising with him. Evidently the British Attorney-General had serious grounds if he was forced to make a public statement of this kind.

Indeed, there exists a Labour newspaper, the *Daily Herald*. It has existed for about 40 years, i.e., was founded long before the Labour Government in England came into being. But this newspaper stands alone. It is the only Labour daily newspaper in Great Britain. The bulk of the British press belongs to the Conservative Party, but the Labour Government is backed by only one Labour daily, although one year ago the Labour Party received two-thirds of the votes of the British electors. This is one of the important factors explaining why Sir Hartley Shawcross longs for an objective and honest press.

The significance of such facts is clear to every one of us. Therefore the Soviet delegation fully agrees that we should treat the press and its personnel with the utmost attention and consideration, and that we should try to help it be objective and honest, since this is necessary in the interests of general peace. And the Soviet country is prepared to do anything in this respect that lies within its power.

V

SPEECH ON PROCEDURE

At the Plenary Session, August 8, 1946

THE Soviet delegation agrees with the draft of the rules of procedure submitted by the Committee, with the exception of one point: the Soviet delegation does not agree with the Committee's decision that the Conference should adopt its recommendations by a simple majority and not by a two-thirds majority, as was proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Soviet delegation cannot agree with any recommendations being adopted at the Conference by a majority of one vote, that eleven delegations should impose their proposals upon the ten other delegations. The Soviet delegation believes this decision to be erroneous and insists on the revision of this erroneous decision of the Committee.

1. Violation of International Rules

The voting procedure at an international conference is a highly important question. The Conference will have to state its view on many serious questions. It is impermissible that these questions be decided by a majority of one vote. One must be either very naive or very inexperienced in international questions to advocate such a voting procedure at the Peace Conference.

The Soviet delegation feels compelled to recall certain elementary considerations. It is well known that at international conferences and consultations the aim of unity between all their members is regarded as a guiding principle. And it could not be otherwise when the question at issue is the reaching of a common opinion by several or many sovereign States.

Naturally, it is not such a simple matter to achieve mutual understanding and to co-ordinate the opinions of the 21 States represented at this Peace Conference. However, once we have gathered together at the Peace Conference, we should aim at unanimity, at the achievement of mutual understanding and at reasonable concessions to each other's point of view: and we must realise that good results in the solution of international problems cannot be reached in any other way.

Both big and small states are represented here. In order to prepare recommendations agreed between them, the opinion of each one of them, big and small, should be taken into consideration. The small states are especially interested in this, since not infrequently great Powers impose their will upon them to the point of maintaining troops upon their territory in order to exert pressure upon negotiations and to dictate their will to the small countries.

But, of course, this method is not applicable at the Paris Conference. Consequently we should seek normal ways of achieving unanimity at our Conference and not place too much hope in a policy of pressure or in methods of using the majority votes of one part of the delegations to put down the other part.

The normal rules of international conferences are well-known. It is customary to aim at achieving unanimity at such conferences, even if this requires no small effort to convince each other and to reach an agreed opinion, acceptable to the members of the conference.

It is well-known that not infrequently the principle of unanimity in adopting all decisions has been and is applied in international organisations. We also know that the United Nations Charter says that two-thirds of the votes in the Assembly are needed for the adoption of important decisions, while in the Security Council the unanimity of the five Great Powers is needed as well.

During the war, at all conferences of the Great Powers, the world significance of which is well-known, quite a number of decisions were adopted and all these decisions were adopted only by mutual consent. At the Council of Foreign Ministers, set up at the Berlin Conference and called upon to serve the cause of the establishment of a stable peace, the entire work is carried out on the basis of complete unanimity. Only very short-sighted people can think that it is possible to achieve such useful results in international affairs without paying regard to the aim of unanimity between the countries concerned.

The Soviet delegation is compelled to recall these elementary considerations. In the future, too, it will not renounce the honour of defending the necessity of achieving unanimity in the settlement of international problems and it believes that it is impossible to deviate from this principle. This is how we understand the interests of democratic countries, the interests of big and small states, the interests of those millions of ordinary people, as they are called, who by their heroism and at the price of their blood brought us to victory, and who are now patiently waiting to see whether we are capable of fighting for the establishment of a stable peace.

2. *Mistakes of the Committee on Procedure*

The Council of Foreign Ministers submitted to the Peace Conference its proposal on the voting procedure at the plenary session of the Conference and in the Committees. With regard to the voting at the plenary sessions of the Conference, this proposal consisted of the following:—

“The decisions of the Conference on questions of procedure will be decided by a majority of votes. Decisions on all other questions and recommendations will be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the votes.”

It took quite some time at the Council of Foreign Ministers to reach this agreed opinion upon which, I will admit, the Soviet delegation especially insisted. From the above text you will see that the Council of Foreign Ministers proposed that the Conference should observe the principle of a two-thirds majority in the voting on all essential questions and recommendations in the plenary sessions of the Conference.

In spite of this, the British delegation moved a new proposal in the Procedure Committee on the question of voting at the plenary sessions of the Conference. This proposal, which evoked objections on the part of a number of delegations, has been adopted by the Committee. Here is the text of the decision adopted by the Committee:—

“Recommendations of the plenary sessions of the Conference are of two kinds: (1) those which were adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the votes; (2) those which obtained a majority exceeding half but less than two-thirds of the votes of the members of the Conference. Recommendations of both kinds will be submitted for consideration to the Council of Foreign Ministers.”

Thus the Committee's proposal is that decisions which were adopted, not by two-thirds of the votes but only by a simple majority, should also be regarded as recommendations of the Conference. This annulled the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the effect that the Conference should adopt its recommendations by a two-thirds majority.

It is now enough for 11 delegations out of 21 to vote for this or that proposal and it becomes a recommendation of the Conference, although 10 other delegations object to it. Thus one delegation, from among the 21 present here, can invest some or other proposals with the character of recommendations of the entire Conference, as if recommendations of such a kind could carry serious weight at the Conference itself or with public opinion in the democratic countries. The Soviet delegation believes that those who would view matters in such a light will be greatly disillusioned.

All of us know that the recommendations of the Conference are not obligatory for the Council of Foreign Ministers. On the other hand, we all recognise the usefulness of having the Conference make such recommendations and thus help the final preparation of the peace treaties. Everyone realises that recommendations unanimously adopted by the Conference will carry great weight with each one of us and with international public opinion.

In insisting on having recommendations adopted by at least two-thirds of the votes, the Soviet delegation was concerned, not so much with the number of votes cast, as with the desire to see that the method of voting itself should help to achieve unanimous recommendations of the Conference. In this lies the political meaning of the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which recommended the adoption of the rule of voting by a two-thirds majority on essential questions and recommendations.

The decision adopted by the Procedure Committee upset this proposal. It ignores the necessity of striving for a unanimous decision. It helps those who do not strive to achieve unanimous and, consequently, authoritative decisions. The Procedure Committee made a crude error by pronouncing in favour of the proposal that the Conference should adopt a recommendation even by a majority of one vote. Such recommendations cannot have any prestige and can only muddle the entire work of the Conference.

If Conference approves this erroneous proposal of the Procedure Committee it will undermine the prestige of the recommendations which it will adopt. Those who care for the prestige of the Conference and of its recommendations cannot vote for such a proposal of the Procedure Committee.

Why did the Procedure Committee permit this mistake? How could it happen that such an obviously erroneous proposal was adopted by the Procedure Committee, in spite of all warnings made by a number of delegations?

The responsibility for this situation rests with the British delegation, which moved this proposal, and with the American delegation, which so actively supported this decision in the Procedure Committee. The British and American delegations united on this question in order to carry through this decision in the Procedure Committee.

Evidently, they hoped to ensure for themselves the adoption by the Conference of recommendations desirable for them, but they permitted themselves to be carried too far by considerations of such kinds. They even ignored the fact that in the Council of Foreign Ministers they had given their consent to the adoption of recommendations by a two-thirds majority. They

refer to reservations of all kinds which they made during the adoption of this decision by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

But what significance can any reservations have, in view of the fact that the voting procedure agreed by the four Foreign Ministers had been placed before the Conference for its consideration? Reservations could refer only to those questions which had not been agreed or discussed at the Council of the four Ministers. Otherwise, it amounts to the right hand not knowing what the left hand does.

The British and American delegations could have refrained from giving their consent at the Council of Four Ministers to these or those proposals on the voting procedure of the Conference. In fact, they did not give their consent at once. After a prolonged discussion, however, an agreed decision was adopted at the Council of the four Foreign Ministers; nevertheless at the Peace Conference both delegations renounced this agreed decision and returned to their original proposal for the adoption of recommendations at the Conference by a simple majority.

3. It is Essential to Correct the Mistake

But what matters in the final analysis is not that the British or American delegations found themselves in an ambiguous position. At present, matters stand even worse: the mistake of the British and American delegations has resulted in an erroneous decision of the Procedure Committee and the latter proposes that the Conference should approve its erroneous decision.

Now the point consists in protecting the Conference from making the same mistake as that made in the Procedure Committee. How could this mistake happen?

Do the British or the American delegation really prefer to vote as part of a simple majority rather than as part of two-thirds of the delegations at the Conference? I do not think so. The Soviet delegation believes that all would like to adopt decisions not only by a majority of two-thirds but unanimously—would like our decisions to be adopted as a thoroughly considered opinion agreed upon by all of us, so that our opinion should carry due weight.

But Dr. Evatt, the Australian representative, takes a different view of the matter. He explained why he had supported the British and American delegations in upsetting the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the question of the adoption of recommendations by a two-thirds majority. Speaking in the Procedure Committee he said: "Let us suppose there is a draft of modifications proposed by a particular country. The Soviet Union does not agree to this draft. There will be no possibility of obtaining a two-thirds majority on this draft. This is perfectly clear."

Dr. Evatt failed to disclose the basis of his calculations. He only hinted at it, having refused to show his cards. For him the most important thing is to ensure the most convenient way of carrying through at the Conference those recommendations to which the Soviet Union does not agree. He cannot hope to obtain two-thirds of the votes in favour of recommendations directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. This is why he is so active at the Conference in his efforts to have the Conference adopt recommendations by a simple majority.

Certain public circles understood Dr. Evatt perfectly well. On the very next day after the decision of the Procedure Committee certain Paris newspapers supported Dr. Evatt with great gusto. Yesterday the newspaper *Cité Soir* said: "The Western Powers gained the upper hand over the U.S.S.R." The newspaper *Etoile du Soir* and some others write in a similar vein.

Such is the reaction to the decision of the Procedure Committee on the voting question, and the delegates of the Conference cannot overlook this. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation believes that the aim of the Peace Conference does not consist in having a particular Power or a particular bloc of Powers gaining the upper hand over the U.S.S.R. or any other State. Moreover, at the Peace Conference all the Great Powers taken together cannot gain the upper hand over any single State, not only a big but even a small State. If anyone should still try to adopt such a course he would certainly fail and cause political harm to his own State in the first place, as well as to the authority of the Peace Conference.

You know that when it was necessary to fight against our common enemies, the U.S.S.R. was not in the last ranks among the Allies. The Soviet Union is proud of the fact that it saved the civilisation of Europe from the Fascist barbarians. The Soviet Union is proud of the fact that it liberated quite a number of European States from the Fascist claws and helped the States in whose capitals Hitler's lackeys were only yesterday installed to adopt the path of democratic development, that it helped to raise the banner of freedom and national re-birth throughout Europe.

The Soviet Union made unheard-of sacrifices in this struggle. Seven million people—such are the losses of my country. The Red Army's services, and the incalculable losses suffered by the Soviet Union entitle us to recall here that the voice of the Soviet Union, as well as the voices of other democratic countries urging the greatest possible unanimity in international problems, deserves to be listened to.

Now, when we have won victory and are obliged to work for the establishment of stable peace, attempts to oppose a majority

of the Conference to a minority will result in nothing good. They will not find a favourable response on the part of democratic public opinion, but will only undermine the authority of the Conference which all of us must cherish.

The Soviet delegation takes this opportunity to insist that the mistake made by the Procedure Committee should be corrected. The mistake can be corrected if there is still time. But the mistake can also be deepened by continuing along the wrong course. The Procedure Committee made a crude mistake which strikes a blow at the prestige of the Conference. The Soviet delegation proposes that this mistake be corrected and that the international prestige of the Paris Conference be thus upheld.

The Soviet delegation proposes that the recommendation of the Procedure Committee on the voting question be rejected and the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers on this question be approved.

VI

ITALY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

Speech at the Plenary Session, August 13, 1946

WE have heard Signor de Gasperi's speech concerning the draft Peace Treaty with Italy. If this speech correctly expresses the policy of new Italy, then it deserves attention, both for what was said and for what was passed over in silence. In any case, this speech, directed against the draft Peace Treaty and which may occasion considerable perplexity, cannot be left unanswered.

1. Our Attitude To Italy

The Soviet Union's view of Italy can be set forth very briefly. I hope that this view will coincide with the views of many delegates present here.

Everyone is aware of Italy's historic merits. Both in the history of the remote past and in modern history Italy has held an outstanding place. Her culture and national liberation movement, and the great creative talent of the Italian nation, have always enjoyed universal recognition. We Soviet people are confident of Italy's future as a great country. We do not doubt that the great Italian people will extricate itself from present difficulties, and will really take the broad road of national rebirth and revival, worthy of a great and free Italy.

Here at this Peace Conference we are above all interested in Italy's position among the other nations of Europe. Of especial importance is the question of the extent to which she will be able to act as an important factor in establishing friendship with other nations, and in securing peace in Europe.

It is well known that after the First World War Italy took a different path. Mussolini's Italy proclaimed a programme of imperialist expansion, and was carried away by a policy of seizing foreign territories, satisfying her appetite at the expense of small nations—Albania and Ethiopia. Fascist Italy became a bulwark of the Hitlerite Axis in Europe and then, together with Germany and Japan and under the false flag of the anti-Comintern Pact, took the road of the adventurist plans of the German and Japanese imperialists, who were striving to attain world supremacy. Fascist Italy bears grave responsibility for the annexationist war in alliance with Hitlerite Germany, for predatory aggression against Albania and Ethiopia, as well as for the bloody assault on Yugoslavia and Greece and for the inglorious invasion of France and the Soviet Union.

It was only after the Germans' defeat at Stalingrad and the successful offensive of the Anglo-American troops in North Africa and Southern Italy that the Fascist regime collapsed and democratic reconstruction commenced in Italy. From that time it became possible for Italy to cease to be a hotbed of aggression and be transformed into an important factor for stable peace in Europe.

As a result of the defeat of Germany and her Fascist allies, great changes have come about in Europe. The Allied States now have the opportunity of directing the development of Germany along democratic lines, and of preventing her revival as a new aggressive force. This is still more the case with Italy.

This does not mean that the Italian Republic should become a weak, second-rate European State. Nor does it mean that Italy should lose her significance as an important political factor in the Mediterranean. At present various Great Powers are seeking to gain a monopolist position in the Mediterranean, pushing not only Italy but also France—these most important Mediterranean Powers—into the background. Such a situation cannot conform to the development of friendly relations among the European States, nor can it correspond to the interests of stable peace in Europe. Not only France but Italy, too, should feel assured of their position as Mediterranean States.

Fascist Italy, which based her well-being on expansion and the annexation of small States, discredited herself in the eyes of the peoples, and collapsed. The new Italy, inasmuch as she strives to achieve national rebirth on the basis of all-round development of her internal forces, and to establish friendly relations with her neighbours and all peace-loving countries, should receive active support from all democratic States. Can one doubt that the Italian Republic will then grow strong as a powerful factor for peace and progress in Europe?

It is not easy for the new Italy to rise firmly to her feet immediately after the overthrow of Fascism. To achieve this, she should carry out a radical transformation of her whole political life, in order to become a progressive democratic Republic; she should overcome the existing economic sabotage carried on by forces hostile to a democratic Italy; she should organise, in a new way, educational work among the broad masses of the people, among whom reactionary forces, in alliance with the remnants of Fascism, are stubbornly defending their positions, changing their colours, and adjusting themselves to the new situation.

Italy cannot become a democratic Republic unless she extirpates the last remnants of Fascism and Fascist ideology. This task has by no means been accomplished as yet; one must remember that for over two decades Fascism poisoned the conscience of the Italian nation, using for this purpose all the means of material and spiritual influence.

2. De Gasperi's Declaration and Old Annexationist Claims

Signor de Gasperi's speech by no means supplies an adequate answer to questions arising in connection with the Peace Treaty for Italy. This speech represents an attempt to evade the fundamental problems of the revival of Italy as a democratic State, and does not express any desire whatever to repudiate and condemn the aggressive policy of Fascist imperialism.

The head of the Italian delegation found no words to condemn Fascism, which caused Italy's present extremely grave plight. One would think that Italy had already put an end to all the remnants of Fascism, and could forget the anti-democratic legacy left by Fascism. Similarly, his speech did not contain a single word of condemnation of the adventurist foreign policy of Mussolini's government, which caused tremendous calamities to Italy's neighbours and other nations, and burdened Italy with a grave responsibility.

There is no need to dwell here in detail on the speech of the leader of the Italian delegation. Yet we cannot pass over the fact that his speech was, to a considerable extent, aimed at defending the annexationist claims of the old Italy, rather than at defending the true national interests and vital requirements of his people,

You have heard Signor de Gasperi concentrate on defending Italy's claims to the western part of the Julian March, together with Trieste city. Fanning passions around this question, he has demonstrated how remote the foreign policy aspirations of the present leaders of Italy still are from a truly democratic

foreign policy. Fascist Italy fastened her teeth into the Slav territory of the Julian March which she had seized, and sought to push farther east; but the leader of the Italian delegation at this Conference was surely bound to understand that these annexationist tendencies are too obviously incompatible with the real possibilities of the present moment. This may explain why he did not claim the whole of the Julian March but only its western part, including the entire western coast of Istria, with the main cities and ports of the Istrian Peninsula.

Speaking in the name of the new Italy, the leader of the delegation once again championed the claims of the old, imperialist Italy, and so proved that it is not easy for the Italian Government to take in practice the path of a really new, really democratic foreign policy.

Before the end of the First World War the Istrian Peninsula and Trieste city never belonged to Italy. During the division of booty after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy received the Peninsula of Istria, despite the fact that Slovenes and Croats had always formed the bulk of the population. Thus a grave mistake was committed in regard to Yugoslavia, from whom territories with an ancient Slav population were separated, and without any justification whatever, transferred to Italy. Whereas before the First World War Istria, with her Slovene and Croat population, was under the yoke of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, after the First World War Slav Istria fell under the yoke of Fascist Italy.

Furthermore, the Italian authorities did everything they could to enlarge the Italian part of the population of Trieste city in order to make use of the capital city of Istria, as well as of other towns, as a means of establishing their domination over the entire Istrian Peninsula, with its Slav population. This policy did not differ essentially from the German policy of "Drang nach Osten," from the German policy of seizing Slav territories. It is well-known from history that Germany strove to expand eastwards, seizing Slav lands and Germanising the Slav population. The same policy of seizing Slav lands was pursued by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Fascist Italy, too, did not want to lag behind them in this respect.

We are also aware of the consequences. Having seized Istria, Fascist Italy, jointly with Germany, made use of this territory for the attack on Yugoslavia during the last war.

Such is the actual state of affairs. The leader of the Italian delegation found nothing better than to come out in this Conference with his claim to, if not the whole, at least the most important part of Istria—the entire western coast. His references to the ethnical factor, and to the fact that the Italian population forms the majority in some coastal towns of Istria,

certainly provide no justification for cutting off part of Slav Istria from Yugoslavia and giving it to Italy.

The leader of the Italian delegation made his claims to western Istria and Trieste the focal point of his speech. We cannot admit, however, that these claims are the voice of new, democratic Italy. No, quite the opposite is the case. This is a mere repetition of Italy's old annexationist claims to foreign lands, to lands that have belonged to Slavs from times immemorial. To repeat old claims, to champion imperialist traditions, is not to march in step with new times. The time is past when Slav lands were an object of division among European Powers, when Slav peoples groaned under the yoke of western and eastern conquerors. It is well known that, to-day, the Slav nations have found their place in the ranks of the Allied States, and that in all Slav countries their life as States is now being built on a progressive, democratic foundation.

Among the other Slav and non-Slav States, Yugoslavia holds the glorious place of an heroic fighter in the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition, and it is common knowledge that she shouldered the extreme burden of German and Italian occupation and bore enormous sacrifices in the struggle against our common enemies. In these circumstances it cannot be doubted that Italy's claims to Istria, or to part of it, are as groundless as Yugoslavia's claims to Istria, with its Slovene and Croat population, are well founded. If some Italian politicians have not realised this until now, this only proves how stubborn are the old annexationist traditions, where we would like to see the Italian Republic pursuing a really new, really democratic foreign policy.

It is also clear that were the new Italy to continue along this path, the path of forcible annexation of certain Slav or other foreign lands, we would not be able to expect stable friendly relations to be established between Italy and all other democratic countries. Meanwhile, it is in the interests of Italy herself, as of all other peace-loving countries of Europe, that the Italian Republic should at last put an end to its old policy of expansion, and that Italy establish normal friendly relations with other countries, and in the first place with her neighbours. Only then will Italy in practice become an important factor for the consolidation of peace in Europe, which all of us so much desire.

We greet the new Italy striving for national revival but we refuse to admit that Italy's attempts to seize foreign territories accord with her true national interests. It is well known that attempts of this kind, directed against other nations, prove the annexationist tendencies of certain narrow circles, but by no means express the true national interests of the people, which above all demand economic revival on the basis of developing the internal forces of the country, and the establishment of good friendly relations with other peoples.

3. *The Treaty and the National Interests of Italy*

Signor de Gasperi dealt scarcely at all with the economic clauses of the Peace Treaty although it is these clauses that can affect the position of every worker, every peasant, every citizen of the Italian Republic and be reflected in the entire future existence of the Italian State. It can be assumed that he treated the economic clauses of the treaty as a secondary matter to be considered in committee, and not at the Conference itself.

However, Italy, weakened by the war perhaps more than other countries of Europe, lags behind in her economic rehabilitation. Suffice it to mention that because of the difficulties involved in restoring industry, two million Italian workers are still unemployed.

The occupation expenditures of Italy have reached enormous dimensions, and will have very grave consequences if they are prolonged. Even a small reduction of these expenditures would suffice to cover in full the reparations which Italy should assume in order to compensate even partially the damage caused to the Soviet Union and to other Allied countries.

The head of the Italian delegation evidently attaches no significance to those parts of the Peace Treaty which can affect the entire economic life of the Italian people and Italy's whole further development as a State. In the end the people will certainly realise its position, even if some Italian leaders are excessively carried away by foreign policy plans and claims to foreign lands, and forget their duty of securing every Italian's piece of bread and of taking care of his other vital requirements.

But one should not overlook the consequences of this situation. The Soviet Union treats with extreme caution such demands as, for instance, that of granting citizens of any foreign State belonging to the United Nations equal rights with the Italians in all matters relating to trade, industry, shipping and other business activities in Italy.

It is well known that the Soviet Union proposed the restriction of these excessive claims of foreign Powers and foreigners generally in Italy. We call attention to the danger that powerful foreign States possessing large capital and wielding strong means of pressure may use these practically unrestricted rights to the detriment of the national interests of the Italian Republic, referring in this case to the "equal rights of the United Nations" and to the impermissibility of so-called discrimination.

We cannot endorse such excessive claims of foreign capital on democratic Italy, which can lead to the economic enslavement of Italy by foreign trusts and cartels—as frequently

happens to temporarily weakened countries and to small States, but is, however, disregarded by certain politicians who give themselves out to be certificated defenders of small peoples.

We believe that Italy can live very well without western Istria, as this will not affect the real interests of the Italian nation. But if industry or trade or shipping in Italy are strangled by the competition of strong foreign States, which have grown still richer during the war, then the whole Italian nation will feel this heavy burden. We should foresee this danger now, and obviate it in time.

The protection of Italian industry and agriculture, as well as of Italian trade and shipping, against the pressure of strong foreign Powers under the guise of equal rights and of impermissibility of discrimination—pressure which may result in Italy's economic enslavement—is unquestionably a most important national interest of Italy or of any other State weakened by the war, not to speak of small countries on which it is desired to impose similar enslaving economic terms.

The Soviet Union develops its economic relations with other countries on terms which favour their economic regeneration on terms which contribute to the revival of their industries, their agriculture and their entire national economic life. The Soviet Union would like to hope that other countries, too, will express their readiness to assist the Italian Republic to revive her economic life on terms which preclude economic enslavement and outside pressure on independent, free Italy.

Matters have come to such a pass that Italy is required to grant so-called equal opportunities to all foreign states in developing civil aviation on Italian territory. This means that if Italy grants certain favourable conditions for developing civil aviation on Italian territory to some State which established friendly relations with her, she is also obliged to grant similar favourable conditions for developing civil aviation on her territory to every other foreign State that desires to lay such a claim, even if this State had not established really friendly relations with the Italian Republic.

The application of the principle of so-called equal opportunities in such matters means that even in matters closely bound with her national defence, Italy is confronted with claims which are incompatible with her national interests and State sovereignty and, consequently, have nothing in common with international justice. This can provide grounds for the conclusion as to what can result from abusing so-called equal opportunities, in other words abusing the principle of equality, when it is forced upon the weak in order actually to place him at the mercy of the strong.

The head of the Italian delegation passed by these problems of the Peace Treaty, evidently because he did not consider them important, or he evaded them for some other reasons. To us, however, it is clear that these questions very seriously affect the fundamental interests of Italy's national life.

4. Establishment of Peace and Not Prolongation of the Armistice

Lastly, the leader of the Italian delegation advanced the unexpected thesis that at present we should confine ourselves only to the conclusion of a provisional peace, that is, to an actual prolongation of the Armistice, and that the final peace settlement should be postponed for some time. In doing so he gave us to understand that he has some plan to take advantage of such a situation, among other things, in order to await a more favourable opportunity for realising his claim to western Istria and Trieste. He even cited the argument that a final settlement in Europe cannot be achieved before the conclusion of peace with Germany, although the German problem quite obviously has nothing in common with the problem of Istria and Trieste.

Evidently some people hope that, if not now then somewhat later, it will become possible to disrupt the compromise decision achieved in the Council of Foreign Ministers on the subject of Trieste. From this one can conclude that, observing differences at the Paris Conference, some people are planning to bid for time and to exploit these differences for their own selfish aims.

It is interesting to see to what lengths the leader of the Italian delegation has gone in this direction. His proposal that we should confine ourselves now to the conclusion of a provisional peace means that he is even willing considerably to drag out the foreign occupation of his country, provided he is granted a new opportunity for trying to exploit certain differences among the Allies and can gamble on setting some Allied Powers against other Allied States.

It is not difficult to see that this policy has nothing in common with the national interest of Italy. On the contrary, in the present circumstances the protraction of the occupation for a long time places Italy in ever-growing dependence on foreign States. If, nevertheless, some Italian leaders are prepared to take this path, this is but another manifestation of the tenacity of the habits of the old ruling circles, which should be alien to democratic Italy and which in our time cannot have even external favourable prospects.

The proposal for a provisional peace cannot meet with support at this present Peace Conference. We have not gathered at this

Conference to postpone the establishment of peace in Europe. Our task is to assist in the establishment of a stable peace and in securing the successful accomplishment of this noble task by our common efforts. We need not doubt that such an interpretation of the tasks of the present Conference also corresponds to the interests of the new Italy, correctly understood.

The speech of the head of the Italian delegation demonstrated to us that in the new Italy, too, old tendencies alien to the policy of democratic States which seek to establish lasting peace, have not yet been outlived. Let us hope, nevertheless, that the consolidation of the democratic foundations of the new Italy will help her to take the path of the other democratic countries. The peace treaty for Italy, which our Conference is beginning to prepare, should also answer to these lofty aims.

VII

SPEECH AT THE PLENARY SESSION

August 15, 1946

WE are now concluding our discussion of questions raised by the representatives of former enemy States. Some delegates said they did not wish to speak at this session, as they preferred to do so in committee. But why should one not speak, if one has something to say, since the proposals worked out by our common efforts in the Council of Foreign Ministers are meeting with unfounded objections, and therefore require explanation? Why evade it?

The Soviet delegation is of a different opinion. It believes it necessary to defend proposals adopted with its participation, and submitted for the consideration of the Conference.

There have been other utterances here. For instance, statements have been ascribed to the Soviet delegation which it did not make. This was done, evidently, in order to object to them the more conveniently. But the delegates know what the Soviet delegation said, since all its statements have been published.

1. On the Peace Treaty with Finland

Now I come to the question of the Peace Treaty with Finland. The Finnish delegation has made observations and proposals aimed at altering the armistice terms. Certainly, it had a formal right to do so. I shall merely remark that during many months that we discussed the Peace Treaty in the Council of Foreign Ministers, no observations or amendments were submitted by Finland. We have learned of them only to-day.

The Soviet delegation believes that the armistice terms, signed not only by the Soviet Union and Great Britain, but by Finland

herself, form a good basis for the Peace Treaty with Finland, and these terms were used as a basis for the draft treaty submitted to the Conference.

Now I shall say something about the substance of the Peace Treaty with Finland. The Finnish delegation has raised the question of the possibility of territorial changes not envisaged in the armistice terms. The Soviet delegation sees no reason for this. The Soviet Union has done a great deal to give Finland the opportunity of living in her own way—an opportunity she sought in vain to obtain from the Tsarist Government of Russia. It was from the Soviet State that she received her independence and freedom.

However, in the period 1918-22, while the Soviet State was yet weak, its border with Finland not infrequently proved insecure, because White Finns kept invading our territory. In this instance, certainly, the aggressive elements in Finland were usually mere tools in the hands of outside forces, of great imperialist Powers hostile to the Soviet State, which were trying to weaken the Soviet Union by every available means, and stuck at nothing in their endeavours.

Then began the war imposed on Europe and the world by Hitlerite Germany. Peace on the frontiers of the Soviet Union, particularly in the Leningrad area, and the security of those frontiers against enemy incursion were of especial importance to the Soviet Government in that period. For this reason, as is well known, lengthy negotiations were held during 1939 between the Soviet and Finnish Governments concerning changes, to some extent, in the frontier in the Leningrad area, where the Finnish border was only 30 kilometres away from Leningrad—that is, within artillery range. The Soviet Union proposed that the border be moved back, even if only two or three dozen kilometres, and offered Finland as compensation a piece of territory in Eastern Karelia, twice the size of the territory she would yield near Leningrad. We failed to achieve this by negotiation.

The war forced upon us by Finland in the winter of 1939-40 was a painful one, both for the Soviet Union and for Finland, but matters did not end there. In 1941 Finland, along with Germany and Germany's other satellites, attacked the Soviet Union.

As a result, Leningrad experienced the horrors of a blockade lasting many months, the like of which was not experienced by any other big city during the war. For two and a half years Leningrad, with its three million and more residents, was besieged by the German assisted by the Finnish troops. For nearly two and a half years glorious Leningrad, the heroic city, pride of our country, was shelled by heavy guns day in, day

out, and lived through exceptional hardships and enormous sacrifices.

This blockade of Leningrad became possible because Finland sided with the Germans. That is why, when the frontier in the Leningrad area is in question, nobody in the Soviet Union would understand a situation which left Finland's border within 30 kilometres of Leningrad. No one in the Soviet Union would agree to risk Leningrad again.

That is how matters stand, as regards the main territorial problem in the armistice terms and in the draft peace treaty with Finland. I shall not dwell on other territorial problems.

The Finnish delegation also raises the question of reducing reparations. I must say that, as far as reparations are concerned, the Soviet Union has met Finland's wishes to the utmost. Everything has been done to implement the decision on reparations in such a way as to promote the restoration and further progress of Finnish industry, and so that the time limits and nature of the economic terms should be acceptable to Finland to the utmost. We did achieve corresponding agreement.

Moreover, one should not forget that of all the five former allies of Germany, Finland was the only country which was not subjected to occupation by foreign troops. Of course, the Soviet Union had enough forces to occupy Finland after the defeat of her Fascist regime. It could have brought its troops into Finland and acted in the manner natural to a victor. But though we had all the material prerequisites for this, military and otherwise, as well as every political and moral justification, Finland was spared occupation by foreign troops, and thereby also was spared the big costs inevitable under a regime of occupation.

It is clear from this that the Soviet Government took full account of the position of this small country, in spite of the grave crimes she had committed during the war. Since Finland expelled Hitler's flunkies from her Government and took a democratic path, the Soviet Union has tried in every way to lighten her obligations. The Soviet Union renounced occupation of Finland, so sparing this small country heavy expense, which considerably lightened the burden of reparations laid on Finland and honestly fulfilled by her.

Guided by desire to pursue a policy of goodwill towards democratic Finland, and realising that old Tsarist Russia had committed many sins against little Finland, the Soviet Government restricted itself to minimum demands for reparations, compensating only a small part of enormous damage she caused.

The Soviet Union has conducted, and will continue to conduct this good-neighbourly policy towards Finland insofar as Finland herself pursues a similar policy towards the Soviet Union, and does not again become a weapon in the hands of whomsoever it may be against the Soviet Union.

There may be some people who like to speculate on differences on various points among the Great Powers. We would not advise our neighbour Finland to be carried away by such plans, or to yield to this kind of pressure. Finland's experience of being used by strong Powers as a tool has been rather a sad one for her. This should not be forgotten.

In view of all this the Soviet delegation has come to the conclusion that the armistice terms signed by the Soviet Union and Great Britain, as well as by Finland herself, terms which have proved fully justified, should be reflected in the Peace Treaty.

2. Questions Raised in the Debate

Now I wish to touch upon speeches on other subjects made at this session. The question of the principle of so-called equal opportunities has again been raised here. This time the American delegate objected to remarks I made on this subject on August 13. I must say, nevertheless, that the Soviet delegation considers the remarks I made on that occasion to be absolutely correct at present, too, while the objections on this score prove utterly unfounded. The impression that remains is the one that usually results when people try to prove too much.

They try to prove to us, indeed, that when it is a question of economic equality between strong Powers on the one hand, and small or war-weakened States on the other, the principle of equal opportunities is the most suitable one. It is even asserted that no better principle can be applied on such occasions.

Then let us ask you why you propose to practise this remarkable principle for eighteen months only, after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty? If it is such a good one, then perhaps it should be introduced for an indefinite period.

But no, this is not proposed, and we understand why not. It is because the States concerned, the very small, war-weakened States on whom they want to impose it, do not agree.

If it is a good principle, surely it should be applied not by imposition on the States concerned, but with their voluntary consent. Then we should ask the States in question for their opinion of this principle. Why is it the United States of America, and not Iceland, that is insisting on the application of this principle of equal opportunities?

This is no accident. We are invited to accept this principle for the vanquished countries, and very insistently at that, by the United States of America, as well as by Great Britain—although the latter will hardly approve the full application of the principle of equal opportunities, let us say, in India.

Nobody can say, however, that the unlimited application of the principle of equal opportunities is equally convenient for strong and weak States, for great and small Powers. No one can prove that this is so. That is why Italy and Rumania and Bulgaria, and Hungary and Finland all object to it. And if you don't think so then ask them whether they will agree to the unlimited application of the principle of equal opportunities.

Clearly, the unlimited application of this principle is convenient for those who are strong and rich, for those who by means of their capital seek to subjugate those who are weaker. If, however, one desires to reckon with the interests of the peoples of these countries, one should behave more modestly in such matters, and not impose by force something which may strangle the economically weaker States. It will be a more democratic approach to this question if we afford the small States an opportunity of themselves expressing an opinion on this subject, without imposing on them obligations which are excessively burdensome and unacceptable.

It was wrongly stated in this conference that the Soviet delegation, whilst insisting on reparations, objects to compensation being paid for the property of Allied States damaged on the territory of some former enemy State or other. This is incorrect. We consider that Allied property-owners should be compensated for damage caused to them on the territory of a former enemy country, but we are for partial compensation, as in the case of reparations, in which the principle of partial compensation is applied still more strictly. In this way justice will be observed, and the real capacities of the vanquished States will have consideration.

However, the United States delegate was on the one hand carried away by his championing of compensation for owners who suffered damage on the territory of former enemy States, while on the other he spoke against reparations, zealously emphasising that they were a burden on the vanquished States. Yet the signature of the United States of America appears under the reparations clauses in the draft peace treaties for Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy.

This is a contradiction, and a quite obvious one. The Soviet delegation cannot agree to such a situation.

The question of Greece has more than once been raised at this conference. Much has been said about her great services

in defence of our common cause, and it is perfectly right that this should be so. The Greek people fought heroically for that common cause against our common enemies.

Why, at this hour, should we not recall the people, the heroes who took part in the National Liberation Movement in Greece, the EAM men who were the heroes of this glorious struggle in Greece? It is impossible to acknowledge the services of Greece in our common liberation struggle against Germany and her satellites, and at the same time forget those true heroes who made the greatest sacrifices, and earned glory for Greece in the struggle against Fascism. This important and irrefutable fact should not be forgotten.

On the other hand, when the representative of Greece comes out with his annexationist plans: cut him off some territory from Bulgaria, a piece of territory from Albania—and practically suggests a partition of Albania, why should we not criticise these speeches of the Greek representative? What is wrong about delegates criticising such plans for annexation?

To praise Greece, and to pass in silence over these annexationist speeches of the present official representatives of Greece—is it not to encourage such speeches? That is why we should remember the heroic services of the Greek people, but when the official Greek representatives draw wrong anti-democratic conclusions, we should criticise them in order to give the adventurers a timely warning against their dangerous adventurist policy.

And lastly, about the Peace Conference. The Soviet delegation cannot help reacting to the fact that lately the press has carried reports about plans for adjourning the work of the Peace Conference, for suspending its work, and so on. The Soviet delegation cannot pass over this in silence, all the more since some people represent these false reports as the opinion of the Soviet delegation.

The Soviet delegation is of the opinion that at this Peace Conference we should seek to work, in a concerted and persevering manner, for the earliest possible consummation of the work we have undertaken. We are of the opinion that it is better to adjourn something other than the Peace Conference.

We are also not in favour of confining ourselves to a temporary peace, as has been proposed by one of those who spoke at our conference. We want our work to make a real contribution to the establishment of a stable, lasting peace—the peace all peoples, big and small, are waiting for, and all the peace-loving nations are striving for.

VIII

THE QUESTION OF REPARATIONS

Speech at the Committee on Economic Questions Relating to Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, August 26, 1946

THE Soviet delegation is grateful to the Australian delegation for expounding in such detail the motives which guided it in making its amendment to the article of the peace treaty on Rumanian reparations. The Soviet delegation believed it highly important to hear these motives in order to know what reasons prompted the delegation to submit its proposal, which completely upset the terms of the Armistice with Rumania concluded two years ago by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States on behalf of the United Nations. We now know what is the matter, as well as the fact that these proposals are supported by the Greek delegation.

1. *Consequences of Aggression in the U.S.S.R.*

Australia is at least 17,000 kilometres distant from Rumania. One must cross two oceans to get from Australia to Rumania. It would seem that there should be a serious reason if Australia finds it necessary to interfere so actively in the question of reparations from Rumania to the Soviet Union and to insist here on the actual cancellation of these reparations. It is interesting that it was precisely Australia that took this task upon herself, displaying special concern about this question.

The position of the Soviet Union regarding this question is different from that of Australia. Rumania did not attack Australia nor could she ever dream of it. Australia, while she formally declared war upon Rumania, did not spend a single round of ammunition against Antonescu's Fascist troops.

Matters are quite different as regard the Soviet Union. On June 22, 1941, when Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, Rumania, which was headed then by one of Hitler's lackeys, Antonescu, acting together with the Hitlerite band, also attacked the Soviet Union. Thus the Rumania of Antonescu was a party to the conspiracy when she invaded the Soviet Union and came out against the other United Nations.

Possibly, if one lives 17,000 kilometres away from Rumania, one can forget all this: but we Soviet people cannot forget it. We cannot forget that Rumanian troops, under the command of the Fascist Antonescu, invaded the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, marched across the entire Southern Ukraine, devastating everything on their way just as the Hitlerites did, destroying towns and villages, and, having occupied the southwestern part of the Ukraine together with our beautiful southern city of Odessa, where they held sway for two and a half years,

occupying and devastating our marvellous Crimea, they reached the Volga, where together with the Germans they besieged our glorious Stalingrad.

Possibly the Australian delegation has forgotten all this or simply does not want to know about these facts? Nevertheless, I would like to call their attention to these important facts, and to the opportunity they had to see for themselves the meaning of the invasion of the Soviet Union by Antonescu's Fascist troops.

I shall not cite a great number of facts to show the significance of the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany and her satellites. Suffice it to refer to the document published for general information on September 13, 1945, on behalf of the Extraordinary State Commission of the U.S.S.R. for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes of the German Invaders and their Allies in the Territory of the Soviet Union. This Extraordinary State Commission, composed of outstanding public men, was set up by the Supreme Soviet authority—the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

Here is what the document published by this Commission says about the results of the bandit attacks on the Soviet Union by Germany and her satellites:—

Germany and her former satellites "completely or partially destroyed or burned down 1,710 towns and over 70,000 villages, burned down or demolished over six million buildings and deprived about 25,000,000 people of shelter. The demolished and most heavily damaged towns include the largest industrial and cultural centres, such as Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel, Khar'kov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don and many others."

Germany and her former satellites "destroyed 31,850 industrial enterprises, which employed about four million workers; they destroyed or carried away 239,000 electric motors and 175,000 metal-cutting lathes. They destroyed 65,000 kilometres of railway track, 4,100 railway stations, 36,000 post and telegraph offices, telephone exchanges and other communications establishments.

"They destroyed or wrecked 40,000 hospitals and other medical institutions, 84,000 schools, technical schools, higher educational establishments and research institutes, and 43,000 public libraries. They destroyed and ransacked 98,000 collective farms, 1,876 state farms and 2,890 machine and tractor stations; slaughtered, confiscated or carried away to Germany 7 million horses, 17 million head of cattle, 20 million head of hogs, 27 million sheep and goats, 110 million head of poultry."

On the basis of numerous protocols and documents, the Extraordinary State Commission established that the sum total of the direct damage inflicted on the national economy of the U.S.S.R. and on individual rural and urban residents is to be estimated at 679,000 million roubles. Such were the calamities brought on the Soviet Union by the bandit attack of Germany and her former satellites.

Rumania bears no small share of responsibility for these calamities, for this unparalleled ruining of our country. Does the Australian delegation suggest that Soviet people should forget about all this, when even now, especially in the south of the U.S.S.R., one meets everywhere the grave aftermath of war, destruction left behind by war, and ruined Soviet families? But I do not doubt that honest people throughout the world know and remember these facts, which speak for themselves.

2. Compensation for Damage

After all I have said about the ruin and calamities inflicted on the Soviet Union and its citizens by the aggressors in the years 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944, after all this, we must turn to the Armistice conditions which were signed on the termination of the war with Rumania. One can, of course, assume a pose of impartiality and now assert that the Armistice conditions were signed in haste and therefore were not, so to say, thoroughly considered and should not be left in force.

But, gentlemen, I call your attention to the following:—

These Armistice terms were signed, not only by the Soviet Union, but also by Great Britain and the United States, and before being signed were discussed in detail by the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. I shall also recall that the Armistice terms concluded by the Soviet Union and the two other Allied Powers with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, as well as with Finland, were at the time discussed in detail jointly with the representatives of the above-mentioned defeated states and were then published fully and at once.

What were the terms regarding reparations from Rumania? They were precisely defined in the Armistice. An exact sum of reparations was fixed and it was specified that Rumania should indemnify the Soviet Union, though only partially, for damage inflicted upon her, since it was taken into account that Rumania had not simply dropped out of the war but had joined the war against Germany and put in the field more than ten divisions to assist the Allied troops in achieving victory over Germany and her satellites.

The draft peace treaty presented to the Conference by the Council of Foreign Ministers fully repeats what was said about

reparations in the Armistice terms. I shall read out Article 22, which deals with reparations, and to which the Australian delegation has submitted its amendments. Here is the text of this Article:—

“For damage inflicted on the Soviet Union by hostilities and the occupation of Soviet territory by Rumania, the Soviet Union will be indemnified by Rumania; but considering that Rumania did not simply drop out of the war against the United Nations, but declared war and actually waged war against Germany, the parties agreed that indemnification of the above damages will be made by Rumania not fully but only partially, namely in the sum of 300 million American dollars to be paid in eight years beginning September 12, 1944, in goods (oil products, grain, timber, sea-going and river craft, various machinery, etc.).”

When this question was discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers this article of the draft peace treaty with Rumania raised no doubts on the part of the representative of Great Britain, the representative of the United States or the representative of France who attended all meetings where this question was discussed. It seems that this article now calls forth objections from the Australian delegation, which, however, has not presented any concrete proposals or any data in support of its viewpoint about the necessity of a radical amendment of this article.

It remains for me to note that, as compared with the Armistice terms, one amendment has been made in this article: on the initiative of the Soviet Government the period of repayment in the draft peace treaty has been established at eight years instead of six years. This has been done by the Soviet Government in order to facilitate the payment of reparations by the democratic Government of Rumania.

The Soviet Government has also eased other terms of the payment of reparations by Rumania, concluding for this purpose appropriate Soviet-Rumanian agreements.

On the other hand, it is well known that when the Armistice terms were being signed, the democratic Government of Rumania fully agreed to them; in particular it fully agreed to the reparations sum of 300 million dollars and with the system of payment of the reparations as fixed in the Armistice terms. Moreover, the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tatarescu, speaking at this Conference on August 13, made the following statement:—

“As to the reparations which are to be paid to the Allied and associated Powers, we cannot pass over in silence the fact that the Soviet Union, which is more entitled than any other Power to demand full reparations from Rumania,

has nevertheless confined itself to a demand for compensation of only one-fifth of the damage it suffered through Rumania's fault.”

Mr. Tatarescu, speaking on behalf of the Rumanian Government, thus admits that these reparations represent a well-founded demand of the Soviet Union, and that they constitute only one-fifth of the damage inflicted by Rumanian troops on the Soviet Union. He had no objections on this score, and the justice of this demand of the Soviet Union cannot be denied by anyone. One can point to numerous statements by public leaders in the democratic countries about the just and well-founded character of these demands.

3. Erroneous Proposals of the Australian Delegation

But now, you see, the Australian delegation is of a different opinion. It presents the matter as if it were more concerned about Rumania's interest than is the Rumanian Government itself. The Australian delegation tries to make out that in this particular case it understands the situation better than it is understood by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, which twice discussed this decision in detail and approved it.

The Australian delegation tells us that in principle it agrees with the necessity of the payment of reparations by Rumania to the Soviet Union. The Australian delegation has made repeated declarations to-day about its good intentions. But what matters is not the numbers of declarations of good intentions. It is said that “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.” We are interested not in phrases about good intentions, but in the real meaning of the proposals made by the Australian delegation.

And what does the Australian delegation propose? It proposes that the volume of reparations should not be fixed at this Conference and that the discussion of this question be postponed for six months; it proposes that a committee of representatives of seven countries be set up for this purpose, and that meanwhile payment of reparations to the Soviet Union should cease.

Such is the first proposal of this delegation. But, begging your pardon, the amount of reparations has already been fixed. Rumania has paid 86 million out of 300 million dollars of reparations to the Soviet Union. Is this not the case? At the same time Rumania has recognised and continues to recognise the justness of the reparations imposed upon her.

Yet the Australian delegation proposes that the Conference should strike out one of the most important Armistice terms,

start a six-months' discussion on reparations in some committee not needed by anyone, and interrupt the payment of reparations which already for two years have been conscientiously paid by the Rumanian Government. It comes down to the following: the Australian delegation declares in favour of reparations, but in reality its proposal leads to the interruption of reparations.

The second proposal of the Australian delegation is to the effect that reparations should be paid either in dollars or in pounds sterling, and not by deliveries of Rumanian goods as established by the Armistice terms. But what does such a proposal mean? It means that Rumania is to be compelled to export her goods at cheap prices in order to obtain American dollars and English pounds sterling, which is absolutely disadvantageous to Rumania, though it might have the approval of certain circles in the United States and Great Britain.

The Australian delegation for some reason believes this to be fair. Indeed, from the viewpoint of certain circles in the United States and Great Britain it might seem fair. But for Rumania, it would involve great difficulties and might prove to be a noose around her neck.

The Australian delegation insistently offers its services to those who have plenty of dollars and sterling, although Rumania, for whom this would be extremely burdensome, does not ask for it and although the U.S.S.R., which is interested in reparations, also does not ask the Australian delegation for this.

And all this is supposed to arise from the Australian delegation's concern for Rumania's interests. No, this is not so. It possibly represents a concern for the dollar or a concern for the pound sterling or for something else, but where do Rumania's interests come in? If we were to defend Rumania's interests in this way, she would have a hard time as a result of such "solicitude." It would place Rumania in a slavish dependence on the dollar and on the pound sterling, which cannot be permitted.

No, this is not the way to help Rumania. She must be helped in the restoration and development of her industry and agriculture; in the strengthening of her own currency so as to enable her to fulfil her obligations by development of her own industry and home production.

If the Australian delegation intended to help Rumania by its proposals, then it headed for one door but went in by another. In any case, no one asked the Australian delegation for this. So what do we find? In words the Australian delegation displays solicitude for Rumania's interests and for the payment of reparations, in reality its proposal is detrimental to Rumania and upsets the payment of reparations to the Soviet Union.

4. *The Australian Proposals should be Rejected*

Does the Australian delegation realise what it is doing? The Australian delegation proposes that the Conference should not fix the sum of reparations, although this sum was established long ago, and although reparations are already being paid without any objections on the part of the Rumanian Government itself.

The Australian delegation's proposal to leave the question of the amount of reparations open for six months in reality amounts to interrupting reparations to the Soviet Union. If this were done, it would be a heavy blow to the progress of the restoration of those areas of the Ukraine, the Crimea and other Soviet regions which were devastated by the German, Rumanian and other invaders. It would greatly prejudice the restoration of industry and agriculture in these areas and the rebuilding of schools and hospitals, and would seriously wrong the population of these areas of the Soviet Union in the first place.

In whose interests is it to deal such a blow at the restoration of the districts of the Soviet Union which suffered from aggression? Why interrupt the reparations fixed for Rumania? Why strike a blow at the restoration of the ruined areas of the Ukraine, the Crimea and other Soviet territories which were victims of bandit occupation by the enemy?

The Australian delegation insists on modifying the system of reparations payments which has been in operation for two years. It suggests switching to the payment of reparations in dollars and pounds sterling, which it would be difficult for Rumania to obtain in conditions when the U.S.S.R., too, does not find it expedient, and when the two countries—the Soviet Union and Rumania—are satisfied with the existing system of payment of reparations in goods.

Nevertheless, the Australian delegation by its uninvited interference tries to upset the relations which have been established between Rumania and the Soviet Union. It suggests upsetting and throwing over the existing Soviet-Rumanian Agreement. This can only be to the advantage of those who wish to spoil the relations between the Soviet Union and Rumania.

But, gentlemen of the Australian delegation, you should know that both the Soviet people and the Rumanian people, as represented by wide democratic circles, far from wishing to spoil their existing friendly relations, wish to develop them further to the benefit of both countries. And this is in the interests of all democratic countries.

Your proposal, on the other hand, would result only in undermining the friendship between Rumania and the Soviet

Union, in upsetting all the friendly relations which have been established between Rumania and the Soviet Union. I do not think that Australia or the Australian people are interested in that. I do not think that when the Australian delegation realises where its proposals are leading it will defend these wrong and harmful proposals.

You are aware that the Australian delegation proposes that the Conference should not itself decide the question of the sum of reparations to be paid by Rumania, that the Conference should refer this question to a committee of representatives of several States, who for six months would engage in all sorts of discussions on this question. It is perfectly clear, however, that if such a proposal were accepted it would strike a hard blow to the cause of peace in Europe.

Can, indeed, the interests of the establishment of a stable peace in Europe be furthered by the postponement for another term of a decision on the important problems of the peace treaties? Are the democratic states interested in now leaving open questions which were already settled between the Allied countries and Germany's former satellites, and in annulling decisions adopted previously? Can anyone who wants lasting peace in Europe support such proposals?

No. Such proposals can have the support only of those who do not desire the establishment of a stable peace in Europe. He who cherishes the interests of peace, he who really wants a stable peace in Europe, cannot make such proposals, if he understands where they lead.

It has already been proposed at the Conference to postpone the discussion of certain important problems for one year. The Australian delegation has adopted exactly the same course. What would it mean if the Peace Conference were to leave more and more questions open, in order to have them decided in committees of some kind somewhere after the Conference? Would the decision of some chance committee carry more weight than the opinion expressed by the Conference or the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers? No one would agree with that.

In fact, the acceptance of such a proposal would only result in undermining the authority of the Peace Conference and in prejudicing the cause of peace in Europe. If we follow the Australian delegation, which has proposed that the question of reparations in all the peace treaties be referred to some ill-fated committee for six months, and consequently be left open, it would mean the creation of a multitude of unsolved questions—and then the entire Peace Conference would have no serious meaning.

Under no conditions can the Soviet delegation agree with such an attitude. The futility and harmful nature of the Australian amendments to the draft peace treaties with Rumania and the other former satellites of Germany are perfectly evident from all that has been said above. Such amendments cannot help us, but can only complicate the work of the Conference.

But perhaps the proposals of the Australian delegation are prompted to some extent by Australia's national interests? One can easily see, however, that these proposals have nothing to do with Australia's national interests. The Australian people naturally cannot desire us to postpone the important question of peace to some indefinite future, cannot desire that the Conference should break up without discussing major questions, and that, in addition, the Conference should violate and bring to naught decisions already adopted in the Armistice terms.

Such an error can be made by individual Australians as well as by certain non-Australian reactionaries who are hostile to the interests of the establishment of lasting peace, and who like to fish in troubled waters. But what has the Australian people to do with all this? The Australian people, as well as all other peace-loving peoples, strives for the establishment of stable peace in Europe and throughout the world, and in this respect this Conference will meet its desires.

Our Conference represents democratic States. It would not wish to help reactionary forces whose imperialist plans can be furthered by the postponement of decisions on important questions of the peace treaties. The Peace Conference must do everything in its power to ensure a just indemnification of the damage inflicted by the aggressors on peoples who were the victims of aggression and to set the right course for the prompt solution of the questions raised in the peace treaties, as this is in the interests of the creation of a stable and durable peace.

Who can be gratified by the Australian delegation's amendment? If the Australian delegation would think once more about its proposals it would probably realise that they can benefit only those who wish to drag out and complicate as much as possible the settlement of the basic questions of the peace treaties.

If the former aggressors had their advocate at our Conference he might insist on such proposals and amendments. But who wants advocates of the aggressor at this Conference? The Australian delegation would naturally agree that the Peace Conference is no place for advocates to defend the aggressors. But in that case it is necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions, and not to insist any longer on the erroneous amendments introduced by the Australian delegation.

Finally, we should also remember the public opinion of the democratic countries, which should not be despised. The entire work of the Peace Conference is being continuously followed by public opinion. In that case, ask yourselves whether any democratically minded people can be convinced that the proposals of the Australian delegation comply with the interests of justice, and of a stable peace in Europe?

The Australian delegation's proposals cannot win approval in democratic public circles. These proposals, leading to the upsetting of previous agreements, gravely prejudice the interests of those countries which seriously suffered from aggression, such as the Soviet Union. These proposals are profitable to countries rich in dollars and pounds sterling accumulated during the war years, but they would lead to the economic oppression of countries weakened by the war.

These proposals, aiming at the postponement of such important questions of the peace treaties as the question of reparations, strike a hard blow at all attempts towards the establishment of a stable peace.

It is now clear how wrong and harmful are the Australian delegation's proposals; it is equally clear that they will encounter only a negative attitude on the part of public opinion in democratic countries. That is why we should like to hope that the Australian delegation will withdraw its harmful amendments, and that in any case they will not have the support of the Conference.

The Soviet delegation suggests that the proposals of the Australian delegation on the question of reparations be rejected as fallacious and harmful. At the same time, the Soviet delegation proposes that the Conference should approve the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers, on the question of reparations, a proposal which was thoroughly weighed and complies with the just interests of countries which were the victims of aggression and with the interests of establishing a stable and lasting peace.

IX

ONCE MORE ON REPARATIONS

Speech at the Committee on Economic Questions of the Draft Treaty with Italy, August 27, 1946

WHEN questions of procedure were under discussion, the Australian delegation displayed exceptional interest. Now it is evident how this delegation tries to take advantage of the rights granted under the rules governing conference procedure. It is especially active where reparations are concerned. We

observe that this is not the first committee in which, on the reparations question, the Australian delegation has advanced proposals which would upset previous decisions.

1. Tendentious Character of the Australian Amendments

What is it that strikes one about these proposals of the Australian delegation? In the first place, all of them follow one and the same pattern. The Australian delegation makes one and the same standard proposals for all countries, peace treaties with which we are now considering. Differences in detail do not change their standardised nature.

The delegation proposes that no sum of reparations be fixed, either for Rumania or Italy or Hungary or Finland or Bulgaria. Though these States differ entirely one from another, the Australian delegation offers one and the same standardised approach to the question of reparations for all these countries.

Now, another question. In all cases it proposes that reparations must be paid, not in kind, not in commodities produced by those countries which must pay reparations, but in foreign currency, in dollars or pounds sterling, or other foreign currency. Here, too, one and the same measure is proposed for all five countries.

The delegation further proposes that, essentially, the question of reparations should not be decided at this Conference, but should be relegated to a commission consisting of seven members. It even proposes that reparations questions affecting Germany and Austria be also referred to this commission, though these questions do not concern this Conference at all. The very fact that we are invited to adopt standardised decisions on reparations for five or even seven countries indicates that the proposals of the Australian delegation cannot be classed as constructive.

These proposals, however, are of a definite nature, in the sense that the States which suffered aggression find them unacceptable; in the countries responsible for aggression, however, they will meet with a sympathetic response from those who want to evade reparations.

At the same time, the fallacy of a simplified, standardised approach to the various countries is perfectly obvious. Indeed, one cannot believe that the question of reparations due from Germany on the one hand and, say, from Bulgaria on the other, can be approached with one and the same measure, with one and the same standard. In both cases a standardised approach can do much harm. But even in the standard adopted by the Australian delegation it is not difficult to perceive a

definite tendency when the point lies in its attitude to the U.S.S.R.

Only one year has passed since the end of the war, but already there are people, even in Allied States, who have forgotten or are beginning to forget the role which the Soviet Union played in the routing of the common enemy and the gaining of Allied victory; at the same time they forget too easily the sacrifices made by the Soviet Union for its freedom and independence, and for the common Allied cause.

Look at what is taking place before our eyes. It is well known that the Soviet Union, together with other Allied States, fixed reparations for Rumania, Hungary and Finland. These States are paying reparations for the second year, and to this day there has been no misunderstanding between the Soviet Union and these States. In spite of this, the Australian delegation proposes that Rumania, Hungary and Finland cease paying reparations to the Soviet Union, and that the entire reparations question be referred to the commission invented by the Australian delegation, so disrupting agreements now in operation.

The Council of Foreign Ministers has fixed the sum of reparations due from Italy to the Soviet Union at an amount totalling only 100 million dollars, payable in seven years. This decision was adopted after a great deal of discussion, after a very careful consideration of the question. The Australian delegation, nevertheless, comes and says it proposes that this decision be cancelled as well. At the same time we are told very politely: "We are not against your receiving reparations, although we also do not say that you should receive them." Perhaps we should be grateful for such an attitude to the Soviet Union. But on what grounds?

And no reasons, no facts at all, nothing worth any attention, are cited in this connection. The Australian delegation has simply decided that it must display special energy in questions which concern the Soviet Union, and has started making standardised proposals directed against the interests of the Soviet Union in regard to all the draft peace treaties.

The Australian delegation has written so many amendments at this conference that some people are already wondering how they managed not to run out of paper. The tendentiousness of these amendments, in relation to the U.S.S.R., is self-evident. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the Australian delegation has adopted a definite course opposed to the interests of the Soviet Union. All its proposals on reparations are pointed against the interests of the Soviet Union. Among all the decisions on reparations now in operation, there is not a single one with which the Australian delegation would agree.

But the draft peace treaty for Italy contains not only Article 64 on reparations, but also Article 69. Here is the text of the latter:—

"Each of the Allied and Associated Powers will have the right to take, retain, liquidate or take any other measure regarding all property rights and interests within the limits of its territory, which by the time this Treaty becomes operative belong to Italy or Italian citizens, and also to use such property or the revenue from it for such purposes as this Power considers desirable within the limits of the claims of this Power or its citizens on Italy or her citizens—including debts—other than claims fully satisfied by other Articles of the present Treaty. The entire Italian property or income thereof which exceeds the sum of such claims must be returned."

The Soviet Government considers this Article to be harsh for Italy, but on the insistence of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, with whom we are collaborating on many questions, it had to vote for it.

However, when it is proposed that we should extend this Article to apply to all the small countries which bear their share of responsibility for aggression, we say that it is impermissible—there can be no standardised decisions. Italy, a big country, is one thing and, say, Hungary, a small country, another. One cannot allow each of the Allied and Associated Nations to take from Hungary all her foreign assets and all Hungarian property in her own territory—even if Hungary caused no damage to the particular country. We believe this to be impermissible.

In this case, however, we do not hear the voices of the Australian delegation raised in defence of small nations. In this case it does not object, does not make any amendments in order to moderate the appetite just a little. It does not even try to find out the nature of existing foreign assets, how large they are or to whom they belong—in such questions the Australian delegation does not propose to restrict anyone. Such is another tendency displayed by this delegation, a tendency which not everyone will receive sympathetically.

The following situation arises. The Australian delegation objects to proposals which in even the smallest degree firmly protect the interests of the Soviet Union in the question of reparations. But where the interests of other countries are concerned, the Australian delegation does not propose to put any restrictions even on such demands and such claims as might unjustly infringe the rights of the small States among Germany's former satellites. Is this an objective policy? Is it not tendentiousness? The Australian delegation has different

measures: one for the Soviet Union and another for States which are more to its taste. After everything that has been said, I believe this is quite clear. A Russian proverb says "You can't hide an awl in a sack." One cannot but agree.

2. *The Size of Reparations*

Let me touch upon some particular questions. In September last, at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet delegation proposed that the total sum of reparations to be paid by Italy should be fixed at 300 million dollars. Of this sum, 100 million dollars were earmarked for the Soviet Union and 200 million dollars for Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. As we are aware, the question of reparations for France is also before us, and finally the question of reparations for Ethiopia, which we also think must be discussed.

One cannot gloss over the fact, however, that although the Soviet proposal on reparations which I mentioned was published and was never changed, certain newspapers which specialised in misinformation alleged that the U.S.S.R. was demanding reparations from Italy totalling 750 million pounds sterling, i.e., 3,000 million dollars. A special denial was required of this printed lie about the U.S.S.R.: reactionaries of all kinds, as is well known, are ready to stoop to any dirty tricks and to any lies in their desire to harm the Soviet State. But the truth will triumph nevertheless. The Soviet proposal on reparations from Italy is now widely known, and no one will succeed in distorting it.

What does it say? Is it not clear that when we say that Italy must pay the Soviet Union only 100 million dollars in reparations we are demanding indemnification of not more than one-twentieth or even one-twenty-fifth part of the direct damage which the Fascist troops of Italy inflicted on the Soviet Union; and that, for instance, as regards Germany, which bears the chief responsibility, we cannot restrict ourselves to an equally insignificant sum of indemnities.

But we are aware of the fact that in the last years of the war Italy came over to the side of the Allies and helped us in attaining victory over Germany, and therefore we believe it is necessary to show consideration for Italy and confine ourselves to the smallest, most moderate reparations. The Australian delegation, however, does not agree with this either.

We believe that the reparations sum of 200 million dollars for Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia is an extremely inadequate figure. It does not at all satisfy either Yugoslavia or Albania, nor possibly Greece, although in another committee the Greek delegate insistently called upon us not to impose heavy reparations upon Germany's former satellites. At all events no

one can deny that the Soviet Union proposes to display the utmost magnanimity towards Italy.

Nevertheless, the Australian delegation insists not only that the Conference should not adopt these proposals, but also that the Conference in general should not adopt any decisions on reparations from Italy, and that this question should be frozen and referred for a six months' discussion in some perfectly useless commission. Actually, this would mean burying the reparations and leaving without indemnification the colossal damage inflicted by the aggressor on some Allied countries. It is clear that this proposal runs counter to the interests of our clause.

3. *The Fulfilment of Reparations*

The Australian delegation is again insisting that reparations should be paid by all countries, not in kind, not in the goods of the given State, but in dollars or pounds sterling. The Australian delegate graciously explained to-day that reparations can be paid not only in dollars or pounds sterling, although he did not mention any other foreign currency. Evidently he has respect only for the dollar and the pound sterling, and this, of course, is his right and his own affair.

But when he wants to make Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland pay reparations in dollars and pounds sterling and not in their own goods, which are produced by these countries with their own currency, he is rendering a bad service to these countries. The chief point is whether these countries should be made to pay reparations in foreign currency, of which they have very little, or whether they should be allowed to pay reparations in their own goods, which are produced within the country for local currency. In order to pay in foreign currency they have to sell goods in foreign markets.

Incidentally, the South African delegation has come to the assistance of the Australians with a scandalous amendment concerning so-called "fair prices." If we adopt this amendment, a defeated State will have no right to sell its goods abroad, as is done by all other States, but must sell them at prices which would please foreign exporting merchants, and these merchants are entitled to demand by special arbitration the fixing of such prices as would suit them.

Thus they want to place Italy and other defeated countries in such a position that they must not only pay reparations, but pay them in foreign currency, and since for this purpose they must willy-nilly sell their goods in foreign markets, then, as regards the prices for these goods in foreign markets, they are to be tied hand and foot. And prices forcibly imposed in this way are to be called "fair"—neither more nor less. If this is called

fairness, then the Soviet delegation must say that it has quite a different conception of fairness.

In making its proposal for the payment of reparations in dollars or pounds sterling, the Australian delegation did not take the trouble to find out from the representatives of Italy, Rumania, Finland, Bulgaria and Hungary whether this would be acceptable to them or not. Without asking anyone, the Australian delegation wants to make all of them pay in dollars or pounds sterling or, in other words, to make these countries sell their goods abroad at dumping prices for dollars and pounds sterling—in the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions and in countries depending on them. And all this is presented as a fair solution of the reparations question!

In reality, it means that merchants, for whom it is desired to guarantee in the peace treaties such convenient conditions for the purchase of Italian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Finnish goods, would have the opportunity to buy these goods at rock-bottom prices and make enormous profit on the transactions. It is these merchants who would make most profit; with such a system of payment of reparations they would become the chief recipients of reparations.

This is what the Australian proposal leads to. And it is proposed to offer this to us as a fair solution of the question of reparations? There is no fairness here—either regarding States which suffered from aggression, or regarding States which must bear the responsibility for aggression. In reality, such a decision would favour merchants and precisely those merchants who have plenty of dollars or plenty of pounds sterling, and who will derive enormous profits if we adopt the Australian proposal, expanding their capital by means of reparations.

We, of course, object to such a decision.

I shall deal with one more question. They are all the time bent on imposing on us a commission which, if you please, after the conference must supervise reparations in each country for which they are established. Who needs such a commission? The Soviet Union, for instance, is highly interested in reparations, but it objects to the setting up of such a commission, as it would intrude in the internal affairs of these countries, and would offend by its intrusion the national dignity and sovereignty of these States.

The Soviet Union has established friendly relations with all these States, and hopes for their further positive development. The Soviet Union does not press its friendship on anyone, but willingly establishes good relations with those States which really strive to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

To create such a commission would mean to seek continuous intrusion into the internal affairs of Italy, a continuous intrusion into the affairs of Rumania and other States. The Soviet Union resolutely objects to this, as it does not want to intrude into internal affairs of other States, or to make such intrusion easier for others. The Soviet Union refuses to participate in such commissions. To adopt a decision to set up such commissions would only discredit the conference.

In view of all this, we say the proposals of the Australian delegation are unacceptable to the Peace Conference. Out of respect for the Conference we express the conviction that it will reject these fallacious and unjust proposals.

X

REPARATIONS AND THE SOVIET UNION

Speech at the Committee for Economic Questions Relating to Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, August 28, 1946

THE Soviet delegation thanks all the delegations which, like the Yugoslav and some others, fully backed the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers on reparations.

To-day we are summing up the discussion.

1. The Importance of the Question

The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the problem of reparations. Our country was invaded by several million soldiers of the Fascist armies of Germany and her satellites. This invasion inflicted immense calamities on her. Even now you can see the destruction caused by it everywhere in all the western and southern regions of the U.S.S.R.

The whole Soviet people have rolled up their sleeves and are now engaged in eliminating the consequences of this enemy invasion. Just as in the years of the Patriotic War the peoples of the U.S.S.R. rallied around the great Stalin and waged victorious struggle against the invaders, so now for more than one year already the Soviet people under the guidance of their great leader have been self-sacrificingly carrying out the programme of restoration of the country.

We are facing enormous tasks in the restoration of industry, agriculture and transport, in rebuilding demolished towns and villages. The whole Soviet people are now absorbed in this labour of restoration, and are performing great and heroic work in restoring their factories and plants, power-stations and railway lines, the wrecked and demolished homes of millions of families. Tens of millions of people are conscientiously working on the new Stalin Plan of their country's economic revival and reconstruction.

In these conditions reparations are of considerable economic importance, as well as of enormous political significance in that they give a certain moral satisfaction to our people, who cannot acquiesce in a situation where countries whose armies perpetrated violence and destruction in the U.S.S.R.'s territory in the course of many months should remain unpunished and should refuse to assume at least some share of material responsibility for the calamities they inflicted on the Soviet Union.

The Soviet peoples feel no hesitation about the feasibility of the new, enormous tasks confronting them in the economic restoration and technical reconstruction of the country. The Soviet State itself is so constructed, and enjoys such support from the working people, and is headed by such a great leader as Stalin, that we Soviet people are confident that the cause of the restoration of our country is in reliable hands and on the right path.

We shall try to carry out the Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule and we are certain that our country will soon be able to proceed to new and still more ambitious economic tasks than those it faced before the war.

Certainly we are trying to remove all obstructions and complications from this path. Were the reparations problem to take such a turn at the Peace Conference that even the satisfaction of the modest Soviet claims to reparations, already provided for by the draft peace treaties, met with obstruction, this would cause inadmissible damage to the Soviet people.

It would be absurd to think that the Soviet delegation would not try to defend these legitimate and just interests of our country. We shall continue to do so in the future even though sometimes it may not be to the liking of certain people who are incapable of understanding the most elementary things when the interests of other nations are concerned.

2. Reply to the Defenders of the Australian Delegation

The representative of the Greek delegation spoke twice in the Committee on the subject of the Australian amendment, and attempted to explain his view. The Greek delegate zealously emphasised that reparations should not be burdensome for the States responsible for aggression.

Yet the same Greek delegate, as is well known, claims neither more nor less than 1,000 million dollars from little Bulgaria, or to be more precise 985 million dollars, as reparations. This figure is quite obviously utterly unfounded, and only serves to demonstrate an unrestrained craving for other people's property. This also shows that the Greek delegation behaves in a highly

contradictory manner when it says on the one hand that we ought to be more careful about reparations, and on the other hand presents absolutely frivolous claims upon its neighbours.

It should be added that the Greek delegation did not object to the proposals of the Australian delegation, which is very characteristic of its position.

The Canadian delegation declared that before the Conference it believed the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be correct, but here, having learned about a certain unimportant remark of the Polish delegation, it arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to support the Australian amendment concerning the formation of a reparations commission.

You also know that no sooner had the Canadian delegation rendered such prompt support to the Polish delegation than the latter itself withdrew its proposal. We do not know what the Canadian delegation will do now, but its attitude is characteristic in certain respects—characteristic of instability, lack of steadiness, readiness to retreat and change from one path to another.

Two years ago when the armistice terms were signed, and even yesterday before the Poles introduced a minor amendment on a disputable issue, Canada regarded the amount of reparations and the procedure of their payment established for Rumania as correct. It has transpired, however, that one cannot rely upon this agreement. The Canadian delegation, which as we have all seen does not maintain a steady attitude on the reparations problem, must now extricate itself as best it can from the situation in which it has landed.

A number of remarks have been made here in connection with my first statement, and I will have to deal with them. The representative of the U.S.A. defended the Australian delegation, and especially defended its right to propose amendments, thus making believe that the Soviet delegation disputed this right. But the Soviet delegation did not even dream of disputing the right of the Australian or any other delegation to move its proposals and amendments. Each delegation can move not only a correct but also an incorrect proposal. It is fully entitled to do so.

But on the other hand, who can dispute our right to criticise such proposals? If some proposal is made, this is evidently done in order that it may be freely discussed and the remarks which may be made concerning it, considered. One may like or dislike these remarks, but in any case the right of criticism is none the less the legitimate right of the delegates at this Conference.

The observations of our delegation concerning the Australian proposal, like the substance of the proposal itself, have been published in the Soviet Press. Why should the Australian delegation in its turn not publish the statements it made here in support of its proposals, or the content of the reply of the Soviet delegation, in order to let people judge what is right and what is wrong in the proposals of the Australian and Soviet delegations?

You know that before the beginning of the Conference certain foreign newspapers launched a rumour that the Soviet delegation was against the presence of pressmen at the Conference and committee meetings. As soon as this question was raised at the Conference the Soviet delegation explained that this was a lying rumour, that somebody had launched this rumour although it did not at all correspond to fact. We are glad to see press representatives at our committee meeting. We shall be satisfied if the viewpoint of the Australian delegation, on this subject, just as the viewpoint of the Soviet delegation, is published in detail.

If the representatives of the press help to present this or that viewpoint objectively to democratic public opinion, this will be very useful. One should not be afraid of the press, or of the fact that the press will discuss important problems under consideration at the Conference and, in doing so, will tell the truth about available proposals on important problems and on the objections to these proposals. This can only be useful for clarifying the situation, and for eliminating all fabrications and false rumours which prevent people from learning the real situation.

Some have said here that we should not discuss the motives behind various proposals. One might agree that after all we are not concerned about the motives which guided this or that delegation in making its proposal here. On the other hand, however, we are certainly not interested merely in the wording of these proposals, but in their actual substance. The Australian delegates say that in principle they are for reparations. But let me remind you of the substance of their proposals, and it will become obvious that in practice they mean the abolition of reparations.

This is as if somebody in a friendly manner offered a chair to his neighbour, but when the latter wanted to sit down, this friend of his, by way of a practical joke, pulled the chair away. In such cases it is dangerous to rely on the mere words. It is better to look round so as not to become the victim of a poor joke, even though it be on the part of a friend.

That is why we think that one cannot judge of the essence of a proposal by its wording, but should analyse its real sub-

stance and draw the appropriate conclusions even though some people may not like it.

It was also said here that one should not express doubt as to whether a given delegation expresses the view of its people. But it is impossible to agree to such a restriction of the delegates' expressions of view. In democratic countries there exist ways of verifying whether some representative or other really expresses the will of the people. Why should not this question be raised sometimes, if there is weighty reason for it? In democratic countries there also exist fully elaborated and practically tested methods for remedying the situation when a given representative does not express the view of the wide circles of the people, but only the view of some group.

As you know, the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference last year lasted only two weeks. Yet at the beginning of the Conference we saw one set of representatives of Great Britain, whereas at the end of the Conference we already saw different representatives because the people had made a very substantial correction both in the composition of Parliament and in the composition of the Government, and consequently in the composition of the delegation. By the way, this favourably affected the result of the work of the Berlin Conference as well.

In democratic countries it is not so difficult sometimes to find out the real view of the people, and then it is also possible to find ways for correcting irregularities and mistakes. The representatives of democratic countries should not object to this. From this it follows, among other things, that one should not deny the right of occasionally expressing doubts as to whether given representatives really express the will of their people.

3. Reparations and Economic Reconstruction

Remarks were also made that we dealt too much with the reparations problem. The Soviet delegation cannot agree with this. I can understand that the representatives of Great Britain and the United States may take less interest in Article 22 of the draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, dealing with reparations, but more let us say, in Article 26, which provides for the right of Allied and United Powers "to take, retain, liquidate or take any other action in regard to all property rights and interests of Rumania and Rumanian citizens in the territories of those Powers." For them this may be a more important question. In such a case, however, who can prevent us from defending that which affects the legitimate and just rights of our State and our people. Let us turn to facts. As you know from documents I have cited, the foreign invaders destroyed during the war 31,850 industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union, including quite a number of big factories and plants. Before the war these

enterprises employed about four million workers. This was a shock for our industry.

Luckily the United States was not invaded by the enemy. Quite a number of new enterprises were built during the same years in the United States. During those years the industry of the United States made considerable progress and achieved a might unprecedented even in America. New plants were built there, not only for peace-time production, but also new powerful war industry plants—evidently in order to be on the safe side, for future use. This is universally known.

The Soviet delegation hopes that a correct interpretation will be put on our desire to repair as soon as possible the destruction inflicted on us by the war and our desire to make use of all available opportunities for this purpose, including the comparatively small reparations payments envisaged by the armistice terms. And of course we can by no means agree with proposals which might hamper the economic restoration of the Soviet Union, or hinder the restoration of economic life in those districts of the U.S.S.R. which were occupied by the enemy.

We were satisfied that our right to receive reparations was recognised in all the armistice terms both by the U.S.A. and by Great Britain. We understood each other and found a common language.

The Australian delegation, however, spoke a different language. It put forward here proposals aimed at abolishing this agreement. The Australian delegation put forward proposals which not only contradict the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, but which differ from the viewpoint of the United States and Great Britain on these questions, differ from the armistice terms and from the draft peace treaties.

There was a time when we found a common language with the U.S.A. and Great Britain on this and many other questions. The Australian delegation, however, has begun to speak in a different language which has an entirely different meaning. This language, unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., can only be used by those who are beginning to forget how the war went on and what part was played by this or that country in ensuring the common victory of the Allies, by those who are beginning also to forget the sacrifices which the war against Fascism demanded of us.

But if that is so, we will express our opinion and will give our estimate of this situation. The language of the amendments moved by the Australian delegation is not the language we spoke during the war as Allies. And this is a language which cannot unite but can only disunite the Allies, disunite the United Nations.

As to the elimination of the consequences of war, I must state that under all circumstances we are relying in the first place on our own forces, and not on reparations.

Of course, reparations, too, will render us certain help in the restoration of our country. But the main factor on which we rely is our Soviet people, our Stalin Five-Year Plans, and the fact that the entire work for the restoration and further development of our national economy in the post-war period, just as in the period of the war, is directed by our great leader, our Stalin. He ensured previously and ensures now the impregnable unity of our people in labour, in post-war restoration of our national economy and in securing the prosperity of our State in the economic, cultural and political fields.

We hope that at the same time this meets the interests of all other peoples who are ready to march in step with us in defence of peace and security, and in establishing those international relations which meet the best aspirations of all peace-loving peoples.

XI

GREEK CLAIMS AGAINST ALBANIA

Two Speeches at the Plenary Session, August 30, 1946

(I)

THE Greek delegation is being especially active at this Conference in its foreign political affairs. Again we have been confronted with the claims of the Greek Government on its neighbour, Albania. The Greek Government is making claims not on any former enemy State, which would have been comprehensible; no, the Greek delegation is trying to use the Peace Conference to press annexationist claims on its peace-loving neighbour, on democratic Albania, which is friendly towards the Allies.

The Greek delegation does not quieten down, which is very dangerous, as this again creates a restless situation in the Balkans, in an area of Europe where peace and good-neighbourly relations have just now been established between the peoples, and where an opportunity is opening to solve the individual differences between the nations in a friendly manner. The Greek Government does not want to wait a little, to wait for the time when Greece could raise its questions before neighbouring or other countries in the usual order: by diplomatic channels, by means of negotiations, to settle outstanding questions like every respectable democratic government.

The Peace Conference has gathered not to give an opportunity to any aggressive, un-democratic government which does not want to reckon with the universally accepted rules governing relations with other democratic States; it is not the function of the Conference to give an opportunity to such a Government to involve us in its affairs, which are in an unsatisfactory state.

Moreover, the Greek delegation wants the Conference to involve the Council of Foreign Ministers in this matter as well. It wants the Conference to charge the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of considering the annexationist claims of the Greek Government on its neighbour.

We know, however, that it is not within the competence of the Conference to give assignments to the Council of Foreign Ministers. It is also well known that hitherto the conference has given no assignments to the Council of Foreign Ministers, as it has assembled not for this purpose, but to discuss the peace treaties with Germany's former satellites.

It follows from this that the Conference should not place its services at the disposal of any restless and aggressive Government which does not understand what the Peace Conference is, and which wants to use this rostrum to divert the attention of its own people and of other peoples from its unsatisfactory internal affairs.

It is not fortuitous that the Greek delegation raised the question of its claims on Albania just on the eve of the plebiscite, on the eve of September 1, when by the most unlawful measures preparations have been made to return the King to Greece—when in Greece herself, gripped in a vice of terror and police violence against the democratic parties, against democratic public circles of society, there is still no assurance that the entire artificial preparation for the restoration of the monarchy will not suffer fiasco at the plebiscite.

Moreover, the Greek Government evidently has no faith that the aid and support of foreign troops, which have settled down for a long time in Greece and which bear their responsibility for the abnormal situation in that country—that this support on the part of foreign troops is sufficient guarantee for an outcome of the plebiscite acceptable to the Greek Government, i.e., in favour of the King, whom the Greek people to this day has not admitted to its country.

We know that the Government of the Soviet Ukraine has raised the question of the situation in Greece before the Security Council in view of the fact that the policy of the Greek Government threatens peace. Possibly this question will already be discussed to-day in the Security Council. It is legitimate that the attention of the leading international body, the Security Council of the United Nations, which is obliged to take care of the maintenance of peace and security, should be drawn to this question.

But the Greek delegation has not the patience to see how this question is discussed in the Security Council. It hastens to use this rostrum for exerting outside pressure upon the forthcoming plebiscite.

On the eve of the plebiscite, prepared with the assistance of certain outside forces, for the restoration of an unpopular Monarchy, it is proposed to us that the international conference should help this "plebiscite." However, it would be better to draw attention to the fact that Greece remains the sole restless point in the Balkans, where democratic elements are denied the right to breathe, where editors of democratic newspapers are grabbed in the streets and murdered, where such extreme terrorist measures are taken as evoke indignation among democrats of all countries.

Evidently the present Greek authorities so badly need to pull their design through, to carry it out on September 1 in spite of the resistance of the people, that they must leave their internal affairs in the shadow and, for this purpose, divert attention to external affairs.

The present Greek Government, as is well known, leans for support upon foreign troops, which do not want to leave the country to which they do not belong. Of course, foreign bayonets can play their role, but, gentlemen, such assistance is unreliable because it evokes a negative attitude on the part of the people. It creates the impression that the present Greek authorities enjoy no prestige with their people, that they need the support of foreign troops. It transpires that the Greek authorities also need the support of the international conference in their foreign political manoeuvres.

Well, this is too much! The Soviet delegation believes that the Peace Conference will refuse to facilitate these foreign political manoeuvres, which are needed by the Greek delegation before the plebiscite of September 1. The Soviet delegation proposes rejection of the proposal of the Greek delegation, which is striving to dismember Albania and to involve the Peace Conference in this affair.

There are other ways of considering disputable issues between neighbours. After the signing of the peace treaty with Italy, the Greek Government will be able, if this is necessary, to avail itself of the usual diplomatic rules to settle its relations with its neighbours.

(ii)

Following speeches by the representatives of Yugoslavia, Great Britain, the U.S.A. and France, V. M. Molotov again took the floor. He said:—

We are gathered to-day to discuss two definite questions, but we are actually discussing something different—a third question. We had approved an agenda which included questions involving Iran and Iraq, but actually we are discussing the question of

Greece. Normally the matter raised by the Greek delegation would not have been placed on the agenda at the Conference, but we have been unexpectedly compelled to take up this question. Now it will be necessary to dwell on the explanation which has been given to-day by the American delegate concerning the order of discussion of the question by the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Conference.

Naturally, none of us disputes the right of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider those questions which are dealt with in the Potsdam (Berlin) Agreement. The statements which have been made here on this score in connection with my speech were misplaced.

What order has been established for the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers? Quite correctly, attention has been drawn here to Point 3 "A" of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference on the creation of the Council of Foreign Ministers. This decision says the following about the Council's task: it is charged with the task of drafting peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and making proposals for "settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe."

Consequently, indeed, the Council of Foreign Ministers can take up any questions in this category. But the point now at issue is not what the Council of Foreign Ministers should do. It is not the Council of Foreign Ministers that is sitting in this hall, but the Conference of 21 States.

The point is what the Peace Conference ought to be doing. This is defined not in the Potsdam resolution, but in another document which has also been mentioned here. This document is called the "Decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom." The section of this document dealing with the preparation of the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland (Point 2) says that when the preparation of these drafts is finished, the Council of Foreign Ministers will call a conference to discuss the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Thus it specifies precisely what the Peace Conference should be doing. It should discuss the peace treaties with these five States.

You see that the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers is one thing and the competence of the Peace Conference another thing. The two must not be mixed up. One cannot fail to see the difference between the competence of the

Council of Foreign Ministers and that of the Peace Conference. If we want to abide by what we signed, upon which we agreed concerning the tasks and rights of the Peace Conference, we must abide by what has been recorded in the above decision of the Moscow Conference. Perusal of its text shows that according to this decision, the Conference can deal only with peace treaties with five of Germany's former satellites. Nothing else has been provided for consideration at the Peace Conference.

I understand the French representative, who spoke before me and correctly pointed out that the tasks of the Peace Conference did not include discussion of questions involving Albania and Greece. Albania is not a former satellite of Germany, it is not one of the former enemy States. No matter how much the Greek delegation may talk here about Greece still being in a state of war with Albania, this will remain an unfounded and irresponsible statement, invented in order to threaten little Albania and justify the annexation plans of the rulers of Greece.

In spite of this declaration we, by the unanimous decision of the Conference, invited Albania to our Conference not as an enemy State, but as one of the States which helped the Allies during the war against Germany; and we greeted here the representative of new democratic Albania, which fought together with us against Germany and Fascist Italy and helped our victory over Fascism. The Soviet delegation believes that such a friendly attitude towards the present democratic Albania is the only correct attitude. If, however, we take the course supporting the annexationist claims of the present Greek rulers, the Conference will start rolling along the wrong course, towards which they are pushing us.

It follows from all this that the Conference should not and has no right to take up questions other than were outlined for it when it was called. Is it possible, however, that any of the delegations present here has been authorised to take up any question it pleases at this Conference? Hardly so. In any case, the Soviet delegation has no such powers. Nor have we hitherto been told that other delegations have been authorised to take up any questions which this or that delegation might take into its head to raise at the Conference.

As to references to the desire to display liberality, they are out of place, as "liberality" of such a kind does not promise the Conference anything good, but will only lead to confusion. We should refuse to broaden the powers of the Conference, to lead it astray from the path it has kept to so far. We must discuss the five draft peace treaties, and not get ourselves involved discussing questions which are outside the competence of the Conference.

We know that certain foreign Powers support the present Greek Government both officially and unofficially. As recently as yesterday there was talk about official observers from Great Britain and the United States of America following the plebiscite, to-day we hear that there will be no official observers, but that there will be unofficial observers. In other words, even now certain States continue intruding in the internal affairs of Greece and consequently bear responsibility for this. Only the French Government has dissociated itself from this affair. The Governments of Britain and the United States are again involved in the internal affairs of Greece, and are trying to induce others to interfere.

This is understandable to a certain extent. British troops remain in Greece to this day, and this makes them responsible for the situation in that country. It has been widely reported that American warships were sailing to Greece. Evidently the Greek Government needs such support, too.

But these means of pressure upon the internal affairs of Greece are not only alien to democracy, but also dangerous. Is it not time to halt, is it not time to put an end to this intervention in the internal affairs of Greece, which has so grievous a result for the Greek people? Is it not time to cease this outside interference and give the Greek people itself the opportunity freely and on a normal democratic foundation to elect its own Parliament, to decide the question of the monarchy without pressure from outside, to elect its legitimate democratic Government really worthy of the heroic Greek people who are friendly to us?

Now, if the representatives of certain foreign countries were to display a certain amount of liberality in this respect—liberality in the best sense of the word—I think that the public opinion of all democratic countries would only have applauded such a step.

However, there are people who want somehow to support the Greek delegation whose voice is not regarded as sufficiently authoritative for a direct appeal to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Regarding this, we can say that these people could have done it in a different way. The Greek delegation could have gathered the signatures of such delegations in the lobbies of the Conference, without dragging the entire Conference into the business. At all events, it is the request of the Soviet delegation that the Peace Conference should not be dragged into it.

XII

THE STATUTE OF TRIESTE AND THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARISING

Speech at the Committee on Political and Territorial Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, September 14, 1946

THE question of the State structure of the "free territory of Trieste" has important significance both as a matter of principle, and in practice. You know that we already have a basis on which to evolve the statute of Trieste. It has been provided in the decision of the Foreign Ministers of July 3. In this decision the frontier of the "free territory of Trieste" has been outlined; it has been recognised that the integrity and independence of that territory are to be provided for by the Security Council; the general principles were also established on which the organs of authority should be built. Nevertheless, the committee elected by the Council of Foreign Ministers to work out the statute of Trieste did not arrive at a unanimous opinion.

On the one hand we have been presented with three drafts, all more or less similar, by the British, American and French delegations. On the other hand there are two other drafts presented by the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations, in which there are a number of kindred points. The Conference is faced with the task of analysing these drafts and pronouncing its opinion in regard to the statute of Trieste.

There are various ways of approaching the question of the State structure of Trieste. One should remember, however, that we aim at placing this entire territory under the protection of the United Nations. Consequently the principles on which the State authority is organised in Trieste must correspond to the basic aims of the United Nations. The "free territory of Trieste" cannot be regarded as some sort of mandated territory. Still less can it be regarded as a peculiar kind of colony of the Security Council. The aim we must lay down is clear. That aim must be the welfare of the population of Trieste, and the establishment of good relations with neighbours and with other peoples.

If it be incorrect to regard the free territory as a colony or semi-colony of some sort, neither should we regard it as a military base for one power or another, or even for the Security Council itself. Trieste cannot be converted into someone's new base for armed forces in the Balkans. This would not correspond to the interests either of the population of Trieste, or of the United Nations. It is recognised by all that Trieste is an important international commercial port, and it must fulfil its major part in developing international trade.

The proposal of the Soviet delegation proceeds from the decisions adopted by the four Ministers. My task is to explain the Soviet delegation's point of view on this question, particularly with regard to the drafts presented by other delegations.

1. *The Organisation of Authority—and Democracy*

The principles on which authority in Trieste is to be organised—such is the first important question. In whose hands should authority rest in Trieste—in the hands of the people, or in the hands of the Governor? This question reveals the chief differences between the drafts presented to the Conference. The decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers says that “legislative and executive authority is established on democratic foundations, including universal suffrage.” This clearly specifies in whom legislative and executive authority in Trieste must be vested. From this decision it follows that this authority must be in the hands of the people of Trieste, and that it must be organised on democratic foundations.

This decision also lays down the position to be occupied by the Governor of Trieste. It states that “the Governor is appointed by the Security Council after consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy,” and in addition, that “the Governor submits to the Security Council annual reports.” Thus the position of the Governor is also defined with perfect precision.

Yet, in the draft submitted by the British delegation, full powers are vested in the Governor. The American draft has the same meaning and, to a considerable extent also, the French draft. To justify it, all sorts of considerations are furnished concerning the tense political situation in Trieste. It is declared that democratic self-government should not be introduced there as yet, that the materialisation of democratic principles in this territory should be postponed. Contrary to the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the British, American and French drafts demand that the Governor should be master of Trieste. Such is one political orientation.

The question arises, what precisely would be the Governor's rights in Trieste, from this point of view? The British draft dwells in detail on these rights. It states that the Government Council should consist of the Governor as Chairman, Deputy Governor, Director of the Port, and three persons appointed by the Assembly of the free territory with the consent of the same Governor.

It also states that the Governor, the Deputy Governor and the Director of the Port should be selected not from among the citizens of Trieste, and not from among the citizens of Yugo-

slavia and Italy, but from the citizens of other States. Thus it is suggested that half the Government of Trieste should consist of foreigners.

The British draft proposes, further, that the Governor should reserve to himself responsibility for external relations, for maintenance of social order and security, that he should have the right to discharge members of the Government Council and to recommend the Assembly to appoint others. In addition, it proposes that all administrative officers should be appointed and discharged on orders from the Governor, that he may discharge members of the judicial bodies, that he should have the right to suspend the operation of any law, to annul any administrative orders and to issue orders which have the force of law, also that he should be authorised to conclude agreements with other States, to enter into international multilateral agreements, and so on.

As you see, according to the British draft, powers are entirely delegated to the Governor. Approximately the same thing is said both in the American and in the French drafts.

The question arises: what served as the model for working out drafts of this sort? In this connection the position which one meets in the British colonies presents undoubted interest. The Governor is granted rights of the same sort there. Thus in India the Governor-General, being Viceroy as well, presides whenever he desires over the meetings of the Council of Ministers, while the Ministers themselves are appointed by the same Governor-General. It depends on the Governor-General's own will whether he agrees or disagrees with this or that Bill, and the Governor-General can publish any ordinance which in his opinion is necessitated by the given circumstances. The police and security organs are in the hands of the Governor-General of India. It remains to add that the same rights as these are granted to the Governors in the individual provinces of India.

Take another example. In West Africa there is a British colony called the Gold Coast. The Governor of the Gold Coast has the right to ratify or not to ratify the decisions of the local legislative Council. He exercises supreme direction of the administration of the colony. He can discharge officials if they have not been appointed by the King. The Executive Council of the Gold Coast colony, which fulfils the role of local government, is presided over by the Governor—and also consists, by the way, of six people, as has been suggested for the Government Council in Trieste.

It will be apparent from all this that the position of Governor in Trieste will resemble that of the Governor-General in India, or that of the Governor in the Gold Coast colony in Africa. Now the question arises, is this position suitable for the “Free

Territory of Trieste"? What will come of it, if we grant such rights to the Governor of Trieste? Shall we not have, instead of a free territory, something like a *Governor's* territory—instead of a free Trieste, a Governor's Trieste? It seems to me this danger is present.

It is natural that the Soviet delegation should object to transplanting into Trieste the experience of administration in British colonies. It would be incorrect if in regard to Trieste we stood by the principles of Lord Curzon in regard to India. We cannot sympathise with such a political principle. Also alien to us are the ideas of Cecil Rhodes, the well-known organiser of the Union of South Africa, who said: "The native must be treated like a child, and should not be granted either the suffrage or alcohol. We must maintain a system of despotism similar to that which has yielded such good results in India."

One cannot go into Trieste with such a slave-owner ideology. The Soviet delegation wishes this to be clear to all.

All this means that the proposal of the British delegation does not correspond to the elementary principles of democracy. The British delegate who spoke here said that he did not underestimate the ideological attractiveness of the Soviet draft, but that it was not applicable to reality in Trieste. He failed to prove it, however, and I think he could not have done so.

On the other hand the Soviet delegation cannot agree that the principles which are applied by the British Empire in India and in the Gold Coast would be suitable for Trieste.

We by no means proposed to carry through the principles of Soviet democracy in Trieste, although, as is known from the experience of our country, these principles have produced no small results, and, one may say, remarkable ones. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation the realisation of these principles is possible only at a certain level of political development, when it becomes the really vital requirement of the people, but we believe that the generally known principles of democracy which have attained such strong development in the countries of Europe could be usefully applied also in Trieste. Such is our point of view.

Naturally we must distinguish the position as it arises in individual countries. Take, for instance, two neighbouring countries—Greece and Bulgaria—where the destiny of the monarchy has been decided in the last few days by means of a plebiscite. It is known how it proceeded. In the one case, in Greece, a decision was being taken about the restoration of the monarchy, and internal organs and external forces brought all means of pressure to bear, and a situation was created in the country in which nothing but falsification of the plebiscite could

be the outcome. Free expression of the people's will under such conditions was impossible.

It was a different matter in Bulgaria. Everyone recognises that a free plebiscite was held there in normal conditions, and it has become a nation-wide triumph. The entire population participated in this plebiscite, unanimously voting for the liquidation of the monarchy and for the establishment of a Republic in Bulgaria. Comparing the two countries, we see that the Republic in Bulgaria has been established by means which fully conform to the generally recognised principles of democracy, and on the other hand, in Greece, the monarchy is being restored by means that have nothing in common with an honest attitude towards the principles of democracy.

Bad examples should not be copied, of course. But is it not clear that now we have sufficient facts at our disposal relating to the application of the principles of democracy, to show the way to achieve democracy under the actual political conditions obtaining in Trieste?

Trieste is intimately connected with modern political life in Europe. It has some 300,000 inhabitants, who are accustomed to active political life and are capable of appraising the role of political, trade union, cultural and other organisations of a democratic type. One cannot propose for Trieste a statute which ignores the democratic principles of State structure. An anti-democratic statute will not bring about the tranquillity we desire, but will lead to the opposite results. We have long been living in the 20th century, and it should be recognised that democracy has become a vital requirement of the peoples.

True, the democracy of the 19th century is more to the liking of certain people, and they do not want to recognise the progressive significance of the already established, new and very important ways in which democracy is developing in our time. We all know that 19th century democracy represented great progress, and its positive role in the struggle against despotism, as well as against Fascism in our time, is well known. Democracy of a Parliamentary type developed in a number of countries in the 19th century, and that was a great step forward in the development of the life of the State. But outside the election campaigns, and outside the walls of Parliament, that democracy did not attain broad development. The participation of the people in public life still remained very restricted.

In our time, in the age of radio, newspapers and cinema, when in addition to mass political parties there exist trade unions, and when not infrequently even the Church takes a very broad part in political campaigns, democracy has acquired a quite different aspect. The entire people, millions of them, are now getting involved in political life. Not only during the periods

of election campaigns, but day in and day out the broad masses are now participating in the political life of their country and are actively reacting to international developments.

Alongside the great successes of the radio, of the daily press and many other forms of mass enlightenment, democracy, and forms for its realisation, are scoring rapid successes in our time. Trieste is situated in one of the important political points of Europe. And all I have said above is fully applicable to it. We shall not be understood if we arrive at the opinion that we must abandon the realisation of the principles of democracy in Trieste. From this we must draw the conclusion that the State structure of Trieste must be realised on democratic foundations.

Trieste cannot remain apart from the highroad, apart from the development of democracy in the countries of Europe. If we take a keen look at what is acceptable to us in Europe's modern democratic forms, we shall certainly find not a little that is good and applicable for the free territory. And then we shall refuse to transplant there the principles of Governor's powers in colonies, and will take what is useful and what is practically applicable under the given conditions for the democratic development of Trieste.

That is why we are against the draft proposed by the British delegation, which to some extent resembles a colonial regime, and deem it natural that the free territory should be organised without delay on the principles of democracy. The people of Trieste must be granted the opportunity to breathe with true freedom, and to enjoy the same rights as those enjoyed in other democratic States—and only then will everyone comprehend the decision adopted by us on creating a free territory.

In the statute on Trieste the question of citizenship also has importance. The Soviet delegation regards as correct the Yugoslav proposal, aimed in this case against former active functionaries of Fascism in Trieste. Not so long ago we all recognised that it was necessary to do away with the remnants of Fascism. If this is so, then active functionaries of Fascism and their paid agents must not be granted citizenship rights in Trieste.

2. *International Relations and the Right of Veto*

The proposals which we have undertaken to prepare must provide a new place for Trieste in international relations. As far back as September last year the Council of Foreign Ministers recognised that Trieste should be a free international port. Trieste is to play an important part in international trade, and we must see to it that the proposals we elaborate facilitate this. It goes without saying that this must be done not at the expense of the interests of the population of Trieste but, on the contrary,

in their interests. In this connection it is necessary to dwell on the relations between Trieste and its neighbours—Yugoslavia and Italy.

We believe that special free zones for both neighbour States are necessary in Trieste port. And one should not fail to see that Trieste is particularly concerned to develop relations with Yugoslavia, which is its main hinterland, its economic rear. In view of this the Soviet delegation regards as correct the proposal for a customs union between Trieste and Yugoslavia, and also the establishment of a joint administration, with Yugoslavia, of the Trieste railways. Under such circumstances more favourable conditions for the economic improvement of Trieste's position, and for international trade in general, will be established.

One of the delegates who spoke here expressed the apprehension in this connection that this might prepare the ground for the inclusion of the free territory in Yugoslavia. This apprehension however, was not backed in any way. In any case, when setting up the free territory we cannot forget its geographical situation and its need for intimate economic ties, particularly with such a neighbour as Yugoslavia. Concern for the interests of the free territory demands such a solution, and we must take this path.

I pass to the question of Trieste's political place in international relations. All the drafts submitted by the representatives of the Four Ministers contain a proposal on the demilitarisation of Trieste. Yet only the Soviet draft says that the free territory must be neutral as well. Recognition of neutrality means that there would be no armed forces—either internal or foreign—in this territory. The Soviet delegation believes that the Conference must support such a proposal.

In this connection it is necessary first to adopt a decision on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Trieste within a certain term. Nothing is said about this, however, in the drafts that have been submitted. Meanwhile the Soviet delegation does not deem it possible to gloss over such an important question.

It is noteworthy that the Memorandum of the United States of America emphasises that the Security Council must have the necessary means to provide for the independence and integrity of the free territory. It is delicately silent as to what kind of "necessary means" is meant. To questions which I put to the representative of the United States here, no satisfactory answer was given either, but it is not difficult to guess that even armed forces might be meant in this case as "necessary means." If this is really so, then the Soviet delegation cannot consent to the proposal of the United States. We must clearly note that the presence of armed forces will convert the free territory into

a military base. This will happen even if those armed forces are formally subordinated to the Security Council.

It was decided by the Council of Foreign Ministers that Trieste should become a free international port. But no one has yet believed it possible to say that Trieste should become a base for any armed forces. The Soviet delegation relies on the principle that neither any individual power, nor even the Security Council, should convert the free territory into a military base, since this would add an entirely new and undesirable aspect to the entire question of Trieste.

As is known, the United Nations Charter provides that all members of this organisation should furnish the Security Council, in certain cases, with the armed forces necessary to maintain peace. In the sense of the Charter, such actions are provided for in cases connected with preventing aggression or suppressing the action of an aggressive Power. It is provided also that in cases of that sort special agreements should be signed between the Security Council and members of the Organisation. All this, however, is no reason whatever for introducing into the free territory the armed forces of any Power or of the Security Council, and for this territory actually to become a military base. Attempts of that sort must not meet with support among us.

The question of the relations between the free territory and the Security Council merits special attention. According to the submitted draft, the Security Council provides for the integrity and independence of the free territory, appoints the Governor and finally receives annual reports from the Governor. The Australian delegation yesterday opposed these decisions. They tried to prove that the Security Council would not be able to cope with such tasks. The Australian delegation failed to make any other proposals meriting attention, but they declared that the Security Council, since its permanent members are granted the right of veto, is an inefficient organ, and that therefore the above authority should not be delegated to it.

Thus the Australian delegation once more found an opportunity to censure, blame and spit upon the right of veto which is granted to certain members of the Security Council. One could say on this occasion: "don't spit in the well—you may need its water for a drink." But we cannot limit ourselves to this answer only with regard to the right of veto. This is all the more so since ever new and reckless actions directed against the veto are occurring lately, and are not meeting with due rebuff even from those members of the organisation who were the authors of the Charter. If this continues, then respect for the United Nations Organisation will be undermined at its very foundations.

What does the Australian delegation want, after all, when it attacks the veto right in the Security Council? Do they understand where this leads?

An international organisation, confronted with the serious task of struggling for the peace and security of the nations, was for the first time founded at the San Francisco Conference. This organisation is built on the unity of all peace-loving Powers, for the purpose of protecting universal peace. It is precisely the right of veto granted to the five Great Powers in the Security Council that is the chief element of principle of this organisation.

According to the United Nations Charter, the veto means that in all important questions concerning the interests of peace, the United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China must act in accord, and the Security Council cannot adopt any decisions on those questions with which any of these Powers might be in disagreement. That means that the veto prevents a situation in which two, three, or even four Powers agree between themselves and act against one or other of the five chief States.

The veto stimulates the Great Powers to work jointly, hindering the intrigues of some against others, which undoubtedly conforms to the interests of all the United Nations and to the interests of universal peace. It goes without saying that this does not eliminate present disagreements and disputes; however, free and open discussion on disputed questions, when there is a right of veto, provides in the long run a better way towards mutual understanding and concessions, towards co-operation and agreements. Thus the veto is aimed at benefiting all the peace-loving States, great and small, by the actions of the Great Powers.

No right of veto was vested in the Great Powers in the League of Nations. The League was built formally on the principles of the equality of the great and small States. Those who now advocate the abolition of the veto are dragging us back from the United Nations Organisation to something resembling the League of Nations. But it is precisely this which determines the political meaning of those actions as well.

It is necessary to recall some pre-war events. The League of Nations was created after the World War in 1914-18. It was the first experiment in setting up an international organisation, and it cannot be regarded as successful. In fact, the League of Nations failed to play a substantial part in defending peace.

The League of Nations failed to become an efficient organisation protecting the security of the peoples, and moreover it failed

to defend even the security of the countries of the Anglo-French group, which enjoyed a dominating influence in that first international organisation. How it ended—we know.

The League of Nations vividly demonstrated its impotence in defending the cause of peace when a new storm was looming on the horizon. Decision of the question was then transferred from Geneva to Munich, as the aggressor demanded. The disgrace of Munich consists in that those Powers which played a leading part in the League of Nations signed a statement on their own impotence to defend the cause of peace, and stooped to strike a bargain with the aggressor—doing so behind the backs of other peace-loving countries and at the expense of their interests, thereby only encouraging the aggressor in his plans for military adventures.

Munich led us to a new world war, convincingly proving that without a united front of all peace-loving Powers, due opposition to aggression cannot be achieved, and the cause of peace cannot be defended.

In the course of the last war a bloc of Great Powers came into being, and they took the lead of the democratic countries and routed the aggressor in the west and in the east. As a result of this it was recognised as necessary to set up a new international organisation to defend the peace and security of the peoples. The United Nations Organisation appeared, along with the Security Council and the right of veto. An attempt was thereby made at last to create an efficient organisation to ensure universal security.

It is precisely the veto that plays a leading part in this. The veto principle demands that all the Great Powers give attention to their common interests and the interests of universal peace, hindering the creation of narrow blocs and groups of some Powers against other Powers, and still more hindering anyone from bargaining with an aggressor behind the backs and contrary to the interests of peace-loving countries.

What can renunciation of the right of veto in the United Nations Organisation mean? It is not difficult to guess that it could untie someone's hands for certain actions. Renunciation of the right of veto would facilitate, of course, setting up of narrow groups and blocs among the Great Powers, and in any case would untie the hands of those who oppose the united front of the United Nations in defending the cause of peace. But we have already tried that path. Along that path we reached the second World War. This path promises nothing but a disgraceful collapse of the United Nations Organisation.

Such plans meet the desires of reactionary circles alone, and help only the camp of the unbridled imperialists. They do

not conceal that they feel uncomfortable about collaboration with the Soviet State. There are not a few people in these circles, of course, incessantly inclined towards cooking up new anti-Soviet projects. But we have before us the unforgettable experience of the League of Nations. It tried to defend peace without the Soviet Union, and even directly at the expense of the Soviet Union's interests. Nothing good came of that.

In our time it is dangerous to ignore the Soviet Union, to forget the importance of its support in matters affecting peace. This path could be taken only by those who, instead of collaboration with the Soviet Union, prefer to build their calculations on bargains and agreements with a future aggressor, which, of course, has nothing in common with the interests of peace and international security. Such calculations have already been defeated before. And they will be defeated in the future, for which purpose it is particularly important to expose their ferocious imperialist essence to the people in time, to expose their incompatibility with the interests of the peace and security of the peoples.

A new organisation to defend the peace sprang up after the second World War. On the Security Council has now been imposed the task of ensuring the collaboration of all the Great Powers, and at the same time displaying undeviating care for the interests of universal peace. No such organisation existed either in the 19th century or before the first World War, or before the second. An international organisation has been created which is built on the principle of allowing no neglect either of the Soviet Union or of the other peace-loving States. The right of veto is intended for this very purpose.

Of course, the veto is no panacea. Blocs and groups occur nowadays too, and yet the principle of the veto furnishes a certain basis for the development of collaboration among the Powers in defending the security of the nations, no matter how big the difficulties. If we really stand for peace and security, we must value this weapon which is intended to serve such important aims.

Among the Powers there are no few difficulties, of course, on these or other questions, and disputes are inevitable. Yet we have already more than once found ways of solving disagreements. These ways are not barred to us in the future, either, and especially if we all understand that attempts to dictate the will of one Power or of one group of Powers to other Powers are inconsistent and out of place. We must look ahead, and not permit ourselves to be dragged back to the bankrupt League of Nations.

In the international organisation created after the war, we must strive to set up a united front of peace-loving States which

will not permit the ignoring of any Power, and which will be aimed against any attempts to resurrect the aggressors.

The Australian delegation's attacks on the right of veto have nothing in common with the interests of universal peace, with developing collaboration among the nations. Impotent, angry talk against the Security Council and against the veto can help only those against whom we fought, and will win the gratitude only of a future aggressor. We would like to hope that these strained attempts will suffer fiasco, meeting with rebuff from all true champions of the peace and security of the nations.

3. Conclusions and Proposals

I pass to the conclusions. The Soviet delegation deems it necessary that authority in Trieste should be organised on democratic principles, as proposed in the submitted draft. Trieste must really become a Free Territory, and not some sort of Governor-ruled territory. That is our first conclusion.

The Soviet delegation also maintains that the principle proposed in the draft, establishing relations between Trieste and the Security Council, should be preserved. We believe that in our proposals concerning Trieste, the latter's relations with neighbours and other countries has been given sufficient basis for decisions of the Conference. Such is our second conclusion.

Consideration of the statute of Trieste has confronted us with a number of important political questions. With the new position of Trieste, a proper settlement of questions concerning reciprocal relations between the chief nationalities in that territory, as well as the question of relations with neighbouring peoples, acquires particular importance.

The Soviet Union's experience in settling the national question might be very useful in this respect. On the basis of the Lenin-Stalin national policy, important successes have been achieved in the Soviet Union in establishing friendship among peoples who stand at various stages of political development and with major differences in customs and languages. We are fully convinced that the proper use of these achievements can bring no small benefit to Trieste as well.

Of course, the Australian delegation, too, should share its experience in questions of that sort. But as far as is known that experience is not great. Australia has only such mandated territories as New Guinea and Nauru Island, with its 2,000-strong native population.

And yet the Soviet delegation believes that we must all assist with our experience in those cases where the United Nations Organisation is solving one important task or another. However, insofar as the complex nature of the national and political

problems in Trieste has been emphasised here, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to declare that the multiform experience of settling relations among nationalities in the Soviet Union will in any case be of substantial benefit here as well.

In accordance with the above considerations, the Soviet delegation presents for the Committee's consideration and for further detailed study in the Sub-Committee the following proposals:—

"In the elaboration of the provisions adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers on July 3, 1946, the following provisions should be included in the statute of the Free Territory of Trieste:

"1. The Free Territory of Trieste shall be neutral and demilitarised.

"2. All foreign troops stationed in the Free Territory of Trieste shall be withdrawn within 30 days from the date of entry into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

"3. The international regime of the port of Trieste shall provide that the port and transit facilities of Trieste be equally enjoyed by the whole of international trade, neighbouring countries—Yugoslavia and Italy—being allotted free zones within the port.

"4. To ensure favourable conditions for the economic development of the Free Territory of Trieste, economic co-operation shall be established between the Free Territory and Yugoslavia (customs union, joint administration of the railways of the Free Territory of Trieste, etc.).

"5. It shall be the duty of the Governor to ensure observance of the statute of the Free Territory.

"6. The legislative authority shall be exercised by the Popular Assembly, elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

"7. The executive authority shall be vested in the Government of the Free Territory, which shall be set up by the Popular Assembly and shall be responsible to the latter for its actions. The administration of the Free Territory shall be exercised by the Government; all agencies of the administrative authorities are subordinated to it, including the police, the frontier guards and coastguards.

"8. Citizenship of the Free Territory of Trieste is granted to former Italian citizens who resided there on June 10, 1940, and who are still residing in such territory on the date of entry into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy. However, the right to acquire citizenship of Trieste shall not apply to active supporters of the Fascist regime in Italy, active members of the Fascist Party, war criminals, persons who served in the Italian

9 police and Government officials who arrived from Italy after 1922.

"9. An inter-Allied commission shall be established consisting of representatives of Great Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and France, which, after the date of entry into force of the Peace Treaty, shall form a provisional Government of the Free Territory of Trieste, for which purpose the inter-Allied commission shall consult the local democratic parties and organisations.

"10. A special duty of the provisional Government shall be to fix in three months' time elections to the Popular Assembly."

The Soviet delegation expresses its belief that the question of the statute of Trieste will be settled along proper lines at the present Conference.

XIII

THE STRUGGLE FOR A DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Speech at the Plenary Session, October 9, 1946

THE present Conference is the first Peace Conference since the termination of the Second World War. In this war the democratic countries stood on one side, the Fascist States on the other. The war ended in the defeat of our enemies and in the collapse of Fascism in the former enemy countries. At the cost of tremendous sacrifices we secured victory.

Naturally, the peoples of our countries want to know what will be the fruits of this victory. Therefore it is understandable that the attention of many millions of people who have lived through the hardest war years, who are full of hatred of war and of aggressors and desire to establish lasting peace and security, is pinned on the work of the Paris Peace Conference.

Our Conference has completed no small amount of work on the draft peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland.* It has fulfilled the important work of considering the numerous clauses of those treaties, and has now approached the end of its labours. As we know, it is not for the first time that the democratic countries are elaborating peace treaties. But one cannot say that the peace treaties which were adopted for instance, after the First World War conformed to the aspirations of the nations towards a durable peace. We must bear this fact in mind and must seek to reach other, more positive results.

This refers both to the Peace Treaty with Italy which we are considering today, and to other peace treaties.

1. The Main Tasks of the Conference

In what does our main task consist? This task consists in providing that the peace treaty which is under our consideration really conforms to the interests of the peoples, to their aspirations towards lasting and stable peace. It must be a democratic peace, which cannot leave the aggressor unpunished and cannot fail to take account of the sacrifices sustained in the great liberation struggle for our common victory. At the same time a democratic peace must create favourable prerequisites for the development of friendly relations among all nations which aspire towards security and are willing to render a united rebuff to any attempts at new aggressions.

It is precisely for this reason that a democratic peace must be directed against Fascism. It must facilitate the extirpation of the remnants of Fascism and of all its new varieties, and it must render every possible support to the consolidation of the beginnings of democratic life in the former enemy States.

In the conditions of such a peace there should be nothing humiliating to the sovereignty of the given country, let us say Italy, and there should be nothing that would lead to its economic enslavement by other, stronger Powers. Such a peace must correspond to the liberation aims for which the Allies fought, and at the same time it must conform to the interests of the peoples of the former enemy States who have thrown off the yoke of Fascism and taken the path of democratic development.

It is precisely from this standpoint that the Soviet delegation approaches the Peace Treaty, with Italy, as well as the other peace treaties.

We know very well that Fascism and aggression are intimately connected in our time. This particularly refers to Italy, which was the birthplace of Fascism and which, several years prior to the Second World War, gained "fame" by acts of aggression in Ethiopia and in Spain, and by its military-political alliance with Hitlerite Germany that unleashed the last World War.

As is known, the preparatory work on the peace treaties was executed by the Council of Foreign Ministers of four States. The Soviet Union took a most active part in preparing these treaties.

The discussion at the Conference on the draft peace treaty with Italy has shown that all the clauses of the treaty which were agreed upon between the representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and France—all these clauses met with support at the present Conference where 21 States are represented. It cannot be said that these clauses which were agreed upon were not subject to criticism here, and sometimes

to even excessively captious criticism. Nevertheless it is now clear that collaboration among the four Governments in the Council of Foreign Ministers has, in general, yielded positive results and met with approval at this Conference.

Both amendments and addenda to the draft have been submitted at the Conference, but—with certain exceptions of which I shall speak further on—they have not materially changed the clauses of the submitted draft that were agreed upon.

But there were also clauses in the draft peace treaty with Italy that had not been agreed upon. And one must admit that in this respect the work carried out by the Committees of the Conference has not yielded material results, and has almost failed to facilitate the elaboration of agreed decisions. This only emphasises the importance of the principle of the collaboration of the four Great Powers. Therefore one cannot agree with those who underestimate this and, worse than that, see in this principle a constraint on the development of international collaboration.

Unlike former peace conferences, the entire work of the Paris Conference proceeded under conditions of wide publicity. This conforms to democratic principles. The Soviet delegation welcomed the situation in which the nations of the entire world were granted the opportunity of following the work of the Conference, especially when the press has reported our proceedings with due objectivity and with an understanding of its responsibility for truthfulness of information.

Even now we should remember that our work is under constant international public scrutiny. This should promote the correct settlement of the questions of the peace treaties, including those which have remained unsettled thus far.

2. Economic Questions of the Treaty with Italy

I turn to certain questions concerning the Italian Treaty. Of all economic questions of the Italian Treaty, only that on reparations directly concerns the interests of the U.S.S.R.

I shall recall in this connection that the Soviet delegation formulated its proposals concerning reparations from Italy in favour of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania and Ethiopia as far back as September, 1945, in London. Insofar as the Council of Foreign Ministers has not engaged in considering this proposal as a whole, but only considered the question of reparations for the Soviet Union, I would like to dwell on this question.

As is known, the Soviet delegation proposed from the very beginning that the reparations from Italy in favour of the Soviet Union be defined in the amount of 100 million dollars in kind,

including deliveries of current industrial production. Such an amount of reparations comprises only a very small part of the direct damage inflicted by the Italian Fascist troops which, jointly with the Hitlerite hordes, invaded the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has thereby once more demonstrated its generosity towards the Italian people, who overthrew Fascism and sided with the Allies.

Not even the Italian Government ever objected to this more than moderate demand of the U.S.S.R., which essentially had only a symbolic meaning, since the Soviet people deems it impermissible for aggression to remain unpunished.

The question of reparations for the U.S.S.R. was under discussion at six meetings of the Economic Committee of the Conference. Sixteen hours were necessary for discussion, inasmuch as the Australian and certain other delegations persistently objected to this elementary demand of the Soviet Union.

Yet the question of reparations due from Italy had undergone still more lengthy discussion before the Conference started. These discussions went on at numerous meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and at meetings of the Deputy Ministers, as well as in the special committee on reparations. Thirty-two meetings were held on this question prior to the Conference, and 86 hours were spent on these meetings.

Thus discussion of the question of reparations from Italy for the Soviet Union has taken place at 38 meetings, and in all 102 hours were spent on it.

This discussion was terminated by the unanimous decision of the Committee comprised of representatives of 20 States, which agreed with the correctness of the U.S.S.R.'s proposal of 100 million dollars of reparations in kind, including deliveries from current industrial production. After all these meetings, on which over 100 hours of time were spent in committees and conferences of every sort, the same proposal was arrived at which the Soviet Government had advanced as far back as September last year. The changes in this draft have proved insignificant.

As you see, in order to convince people of the most elementary things the Soviet delegation had to spend no small efforts.

What do the facts I have cited attest? They primarily attest to that course which is pursued by certain countries when the issue concerns the immediate interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegation finds it difficult to prove even the most obvious things, inasmuch as the necessary decision depends on the policy of other countries with regard to the

U.S.S.R. But the Soviet delegation does not fall into despair over this, believing that truth will prevail in the end, and that one must spare no efforts in elaborating the conditions of a peace worth calling a democratic peace.

3. Once More on the Trieste Statute

Now as regards Trieste. It is well known that Yugoslavia is claiming Trieste as the main town and port of the Julian March, which according to the treaty is included in the Yugoslav State. It is also known that the Soviet Union has recognised the historic justice of these national claims of Yugoslavia.

The time will come when this will win universal recognition, including the unconditional consent of Italian democrats. Nevertheless, after lengthy discussion the Council of Foreign Ministers admitted as a matter of compromise that the territory of Trieste should not belong either to Italy or to Yugoslavia, and must become an international territory under the protection of the Security Council of the United Nations.

The question of the statute of Trieste, the question of the organisation of the administration of the Free Territory of Trieste, have acquired great importance in connection with this decision. We know that several proposals were submitted on this question to the Political Committee for Italy. And one tendency, which can by no means be recognised as a democratic tendency, has found expression in the British and American, as well as in the French, draft statutes of Trieste. On the other hand, in the drafts submitted by the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations another tendency has found expression, based on recognition of the principles of democracy for the statute of Trieste.

The point is whether the Free Territory of Trieste will actually be organised on democratic principles or whether we, representatives of democratic countries, should renounce them in this case. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly argued in the Italian Committee that the Anglo-American proposals on the statute of Trieste actually amount to establishing something resembling a colonial regime in Trieste, under which the population is deprived of elementary rights and entire powers are delegated to a Governor imposed from above.

As a result of lengthy discussion in the Committee, the amended French proposal was accepted. Yet essentially this proposal is nothing but the Anglo-American draft in a new guise, and it presents the population of Trieste with that same semi-colonial regime, devoid of human rights, only in a softened form. Furthermore, the decision on the principles of the statute of Trieste adopted by the Committee runs counter to the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers on this question.

The Committee's decisions approve the Council of Foreign Ministers' proposal that the legislative and executive authorities in Trieste should be established on democratic principles. In fact, however, such restrictions are introduced in this decision of the Committee, as regards both the legislative and executive authority elected by the population, and such broad powers in establishing social order and security in Trieste are delegated to the Governor appointed by the Security Council, that hardly anything remains of democratic principles in the administration of Trieste.

The maintenance of social order and security, the conduct of external relations, the appointment and dismissal of judiciary officials, as well as the right to apply so-called necessary measures, are delegated to the Governor—which in fact means omnipotence of the Governor and a lack of legal rights for the population.

Add to this the fact that foreign occupation troops remain in Trieste, which of course is appropriate only if we regard Trieste, not as an international free territory as provided for by the draft treaty, but as a semi-enemy territory under supervision and subordinated to Anglo-American troops.

All this is in no way compatible with the Council of Foreign Ministers' decision on the statute of Trieste, and is in general incompatible with the democratic peace for which we must strive.

That is why the Soviet delegation will again insist that the Soviet delegation's well-known proposal of September 14 be accepted, and that primarily decisions should be adopted to the effect that the executive authority in Trieste is vested in a Government elected by the Popular Assembly, while the duty of the Governor, as agent of the Security Council, is to ensure the maintenance of the statute of Trieste.

The Soviet delegation also deems it necessary for the Conference to establish precisely the date of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Trieste, and that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Trieste should not be postponed until some indefinite future, as in the French proposal. Essentially, it would suffice for us to agree on one simple decision: namely, that Trieste should be organised approximately on the same principles as Danzig.

All the rest is not difficult to settle. It is not correct to say that no similarity exists between Trieste and Danzig. There is no doubt that there is a similarity here, and the experience of the administration of Danzig must be utilised in Trieste. Indeed, how is it that it was possible in Danzig to manage with only a High Commissioner and to delegate the establishment of the

legislative and executive authority to the Danzig population itself, while in Trieste it is impossible to establish similar relations between the Governor on the one hand and the legislative and executive bodies on the other hand? Why should we go back from Danzig as regards the question of the democratic organisation of Trieste?

Even if it is not desired here to make a forward step in this question—which should be perfectly natural in our days—then in any case we must not make any step backward from the democratic principles and democratic order established by the League of Nations for Danzig 25 years ago.

The Soviet delegation cannot consent to the proposal of the Committee on this question. The Soviet delegation calls upon the Conference to approach the question of the statute of Trieste with the utmost attention and to take into account those wishes which have been expressed by the delegation of Yugoslavia as regards this question.

The Soviet delegation deems inconsistent the attempts to impose upon Trieste an anti-democratic Governor-regime resembling a colonial order. And the reference to unrest in Trieste cannot be recognised as well-founded.

The occupation authorities which failed to find a common language with the local population bear the main responsibility for this situation. All the more legitimate is the demand for fixing the date of withdrawal of foreign troops from Trieste and the establishment of a democratic order in Trieste.

If Danzig was granted a democratic statute, although this created a menace to it on the part of such a country as Germany, there are then no reasons whatever to refuse Trieste the statute of Danzig, which was recognised by the League of Nations. This minimum of democracy is necessary in Trieste.

4. Our Task: The Extirpation of Fascism

To proceed, I would like to refer to one proposal rejected in the Political Committee for Italy. They rejected a proposal submitted by the Polish and Ukrainian delegations to oblige Italy not to allow the existence and activities of Fascist and other organisations pursuing the aim of depriving the people of democratic rights or conducting propaganda hostile to any of the United Nations.

Such clauses are included in the treaties with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. It would seem that the inclusion of a ban on Fascist organisations in the Treaty for Italy would be particularly appropriate. Nevertheless, by a majority of nine votes to eight, with three abstaining, the proposal of the Polish and Ukrainian delegations was rejected by the Committee, and with this one cannot by any means agree.

The Allies more than once declared during the war that their aim was to extirpate Fascism. In the Italian surrender terms the obligation of the Italian Government was precisely pointed out as regards the liquidation of Fascist organisations and the annihilation of all Fascist institutions, etc. No little amount of work has been done in Italy in this respect, of course. But one cannot recognise the measures that have been applied as adequate. On the other hand, one cannot fail to see that attempts continue to resurrect Fascism in Italy.

Even such a Right-wing Italian political leader as Sforza utters a warning, in his recently published book, about the danger of Italian neo-Fascism, which has sprung up to succeed the openly criminal Fascism of old.

Pacciardi, one of the leaders of the Italian Republican Party, recently gave a warning through the press that "Royalist and Fascist groups are openly working to destroy the Republic. Key positions in the administration are occupied by enemies of the Republican system, who are sabotaging the efforts of Ministers." Italian judicial bodies time and again acquit prominent leaders of Fascism who belonged to the clique of Mussolini's intimate friends. Time and again underground Fascist organisations are discovered in various districts of Italy. Time and again recur open sallies of Fascists, who disseminate literature, suddenly seize radio stations for Fascist propaganda, and so forth.

Under such conditions the well-founded character of the proposal of the Polish and Ukrainian delegations, aimed against the rebirth of Fascist organisations in Italy, is perfectly obvious. If we really aspire to a democratic peace, we must accept this proposal. To reject this proposal would only mean encouraging the Fascists who are in hiding; but its acceptance would stimulate the consolidation of the front of democratic forces in Italy, to the benefit of the common cause of the democratic countries.

5. Co-operation in Establishing a Democratic Peace

Lastly, groupings at the Conference have been mentioned here. It has been said, for instance, that there is a Slav group at the Conference on the one hand and a Western group on the other hand. It is also said, of course, that no groups should be set up, and that it is necessary to strive to eliminate the differences between the West and East, and so forth.

The Soviet delegation, no less than any other, seeks to encourage the consolidation of co-operation among all democratic countries. It urges other delegations to do this, too, believing such co-operation to be the prerequisite for securing a democratic peace.

But first of all one must recognise as artificial any division of the Conference by which a Slav group is opposed to a Western

group and vice versa. Such a contrast is out of place. It smells of something stale, of the times when the East was politically backward—whereas in our days that can by no means be said when comparing the young Slav democracies with the typical old democracies of the West.

It goes without saying that the young Slav democracies need each other, especially in those cases when they meet a contempt on the part of other Powers for their legitimate national interests, such as often occurred as regards the Slav States in the past and as occasionally still recurs now. But the young Slav Republics are seeking to establish friendly relations, not only among themselves, but with all other democratic countries as well, insofar as these relations grow on the basis of equality and reciprocity. And one should remember that besides the three Slav States, 13 non-Slav Soviet Republics comprise the Soviet Union.

On the other hand there are attempts by certain circles in the so-called "old democracies" to isolate the young Slav democracies, inasmuch as they defend their national independence and their new ways of national development, and do not want humbly to follow an outsider's instructions. This is particularly familiar to the Soviet Union, which has already traversed a fairly long road of independent, free development; and the Soviet Union has been convinced by its own experience of the justness of the wise words of Lenin, the genius of the great Russian Socialist Revolution, who said that a people that has taken over the control of the destinies of its country is invincible.

These attempts are not infrequently now presented in the form of a "Western" group, although they seek to include in the "Western" group China, India and even Ethiopia, and for one purpose only—that they should increase the number of votes of a certain group. Under such conditions the division into "Western" and Slav groups, just as the division into West and East, obviously leads us to absurdity.

The point here lies not in a Slav or "Eastern" group on the one hand and not in an anti-Slav or "Western" group on the other hand. These labels only confuse matters. A struggle is proceeding at this Conference for the establishment of a democratic peace, which must be the goal of all democratic countries, but which as yet does not meet with equal understanding among the countries represented at the Conference.

The Soviet delegation calls upon the delegations of other countries to collaborate in establishing a democratic peace. This requires that a compromise be achieved on certain questions thus far not agreed upon, such as we have already succeeded in securing as regards the majority of the questions of the peace treaties. It is possible to achieve such an agreement, to the

extent that we all recognise that we are all striving for a democratic peace, and do not pursue a policy of imposing the will of some or other Powers upon other States. Otherwise we shall arrive at nothing good.

Plenty has already been said here about the accepted procedure for the work of the Conference, which does not at all satisfy a considerable proportion of the delegations. If, however, our common desire is to achieve the democratic peace possible under present conditions, we will find a solution for disputed questions, and one should not doubt that this solution will meet the aspirations of all peace-loving nations.

XIV

THE DANUBE AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Speech at the Plenary Session, October 10, 1946

THE question we are now discussing—the peace treaty with Rumania—is of great importance for the entire problem of restoring peace in Europe, and especially in south-eastern Europe. Rumania's fate, if one considers recent years, is very characteristic of that changed situation in Europe of which all of us are aware, recalling events when the Fascist regimes in the enemy countries were collapsing and democratic regimes were arising, which meant a radical reconstruction and the adoption by these States of a new, modern way of life.

We know that this very State of Rumania, by resolute action, freed itself of Antonescu's Fascist regime, joined the Allies, thus discarding the disgraceful role of servant of Hitlerite Germany, and blazing a new trail for herself in the ranks of the Allies. Together with us, together with the Allied troops, the new democratic Rumania began to struggle for the defeat of Hitler, and made considerable sacrifices in this struggle. We all recognise the sacrifices rendered by the Rumanian people in that cause. Suffice it to say that all of us find it necessary and just, in the peace treaty, to resolve the question of Northern Transylvania in a manner according with the basic national interests and aspirations of the Rumanian people.

1. The Problem of the Danube in the Past

Discussion of the peace treaty with Rumania has brought to the fore more general problems as well. It was Senator Vandenberg who in the first place contributed to this by centring his speech on the Danube problem as a whole, and on the question of so-called equal economic opportunity. Naturally, I too will have to dwell on this problem. I must say that the speech of the Yugoslav representative, Mr. Kardelj, furnished a splendid answer to the speeches on the Danube problem, and also helped to clarify the problem of the principle of "equal

opportunity," which is advanced by certain representatives of the United States and Great Britain as something like one of the highest principles of contemporary life. Thus my task has been rendered considerably easier.

In the first place, it should be pointed out that they wish to settle the Danube problem in the peace treaties with Germany's former satellites. They wish to settle the problem of the navigation regime on the Danube by means of orders issued to the vanquished States. In fact, they wish to take advantage of this opportunity in order to restore on the Danube the privileged position of certain Great Powers, which evidently are not concerned about the sovereignty or the national interests of the Danube States, but wish to dictate and impose their will everywhere.

They intend to do this in such a manner that whatever is recorded in the peace treaty, imposing certain terms upon the vanquished State, should also refer to other Danube States, to Yugoslavia, to Czechoslovakia, who are our Allies, who fought together with us against the common enemy and to whom we have no right to dictate, but with whom we should maintain friendship and develop friendly co-operation. The vanquished States and the Allied States are being lumped together, just for the purpose of clearing the road for economic influence in the Danube area.

Is this to be regarded as correct? Is this likely to lead to a democratic peace? This is not the first time that the Danube question has been raised since the war. At the Potsdam Conference the American Government raised the question of the Danube regime, and presented its own project for an "international regime of internal waterways." This project dealt not only with the navigation regime on the Danube, but also with that on the Rhine and Oder and in the Kiel Canal and, so to say, in the same breath also raised the question of the Black Sea Straits regime. Projects of this kind merely emphasise the unilateral manner in which this question is again being raised, and this unilateral manner is also maintained in raising the Danube problem.

Attempts are being made to persuade us that an international regime for the Danube was instituted as far back as the Paris Conference of 1856—that this regime, which created a privileged position in the Danube Basin for Britain, France, Prussia and certain other non-Danube States, has already existed for 90 years. We are being told that this is practically an ideal regime for the Danube in our times.

But I would remind Senator Vandenberg that 90 years ago, when the Paris Conference of 1856 was taking place, times were

entirely different. Suffice it to say that at that time Negro servitude still existed in the United States of America—slavery in America was not yet abolished. As to the States which we are now discussing as democratic Danube States, at that time hardly anyone felt concern about their sovereignty, independence or anything of the kind. Most of them were simply in the position of enslaved nations.

Mr. Bevin has said more than once that Britain has now renounced 19th century imperialism. However, unless we shut our eyes, are afraid of the truth and call unpleasant truths dishonesty, we will certainly be perfectly justified in regarding 1856 and thereabouts as the period when 19th century imperialism was flourishing. It was in that period, so typical of 19th century imperialist policy, that the so-called international regime was established on the Danube. And if we really renounce 19th century imperialism—at least the imperialism of last century!—why, then, should we cling to these remnants of imperialism of the period that we have left behind?

In the middle of the last century, when the so-called international regime on the Danube was being created, not only was the very existence of democratic states in the Danube Basin never mentioned, but as we know, even the very notion of a democratic state did not exist. It was then that the "international regime," created by means of open imperialist pressure, was introduced on the Danube. And now it is proposed to restore this order of things under the guise of "equal opportunity," on the pretext of defending the principle of the equality of States. Naturally, we cannot agree with this. No one will take any such proposal seriously.

2. "Equal Opportunities" and "Dollar Democracy"

Lately the principle of so-called equal opportunity has been freely discussed. What could be better than such a principle, it is asked, when equal opportunity is established for all States without discrimination? The representatives of this view come out now as modern champions of the principle of equality in relations between States. If this is the case, gentlemen, let us discuss the principle of equality seriously and honestly.

The Danube is not the only waterway of great international importance. There exist other waterways of still greater international importance. It is not only certain river routes that are of international importance; it is well known that sea routes, and even more routes linking up oceans, are of much greater international importance than any river system. If we really wish to defend the principle of "equal opportunity" in the

matter of waterways, let us adhere to this principle consistently, as befits real champions of the principles of equality in relations among States.

Why then do we not defend the principle of "equal opportunity" in regard to waterways where the interests of many States are especially great?—such waterways, let us say, as the Suez Canal, or the Panama Canal. Many States are interested in both these waterways. If we are to become ardent patriots of the principle of so-called "equal opportunity," let us then discuss the application of that principle in the given case as well. Do the defenders of the principle of "equal opportunity" agree to apply this principle to the Suez Canal? Do the defenders of the principle of "equal opportunity" agree to apply this principle to the Panama Canal as well? We ought not to pass over these questions in silence. In any case, we shall come to them sooner or later.

As to the Danube, apart from everything else we are now faced with a specific situation with which we have to reckon. The Danube Basin comprises countries which suffered grievously in this war. On the other hand, it is in this very area that important political changes have taken place, and the young democracies which have established themselves here have not yet had enough time to solve even the most urgent problems of post-war restoration.

The Danube Basin includes Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and some other States. These countries went through hard times during the Second World War. They suffered badly during the war, they have been greatly weakened, and in any case they certainly do not belong to that section which grew rich on the war. I do not mention the Soviet Union, which suffered exceptionally great losses in manpower and materials. The Soviet Government has published figures and facts concerning these losses for everyone to read. The losses caused by war destruction and plunder by the invaders are alone estimated at 679,000 million roubles. If, however, we take the Soviet Union's total expenditures on the war, they will exceed by several times this figure of losses, colossal as it is.

Such is the post-war situation of the States in the Danube area. There are, however, other States which were together with us in the Allied camp, but fortunately suffered less than the States I have just mentioned. And lastly, there are States which, despite the burden of the struggle against our common enemy, have at the same time succeeded in increasing their wealth in recent years.

Let us take even the United States of America. Here in Paris everyone of you can find a copy of the "World Almanac, 1946." In this book you can read the following figures: the national income of the United States in 1941 is estimated at 96,000 million dollars, in 1942—122,000 million dollars, in 1943—149,000 million dollars, in 1944—160,000 million dollars.

Thus, in four years of the war the national income of the United States rose by 64,000 million dollars. The same book says that in 1938 the entire national income of the United States was 64,000 million dollars. Thus, the mere increase in the national income of the United States during the war years reaches a figure equal to the entire national income of the United States in 1938. One cannot help recalling these facts.

Yesterday the United States representative declared here that his Government would be able to justify a claim for 20,000 million dollars reparations, were the United States to calculate its losses during the war. But such statements hardly sound convincing to people who are aware of the facts. We know that the United States exerted exceptionally great efforts in this war, in defence of its own interests and our common aims, for which all of us are very grateful to the United States. But despite all this, one cannot say that the United States is one of those States which suffered grave material damage in the Second World War, one of those States which were ruined and weakened in this war. We are glad that this did not happen to our Ally, although we ourselves did have to pass through hard times, the consequences of which will take us long years to heal.

Now that you know the facts, consider, side by side, Rumania rendered impotent by the war, or Yugoslavia ruined by German and Italian Fascists, and the United States of America whose wealth has grown immensely during the war, and you will clearly see what the implementation of the principle of "equal opportunity" will mean in practice.

Under these circumstances, suppose that in this very Rumania or Yugoslavia, or in other war-weakened States, so-called "equal opportunity" is granted, let us say, to American capital, that is, supposing it is granted an opportunity to penetrate unrestricted into Rumanian industry, Yugoslav industry and so forth: what will then remain of Rumanian national industry or of Yugoslav national industry?

It is not very difficult to realise that if American capital is given a free hand in the small States ruined and enfeebled by the war, as the defenders of the principle of "equal opportunity" desire, American capital will buy up local industry, appropriate

the more attractive Rumanian, Yugoslav and all other enterprises, and will become master in such small States.

Under such circumstances we would probably live to see the day when, in your own home country, switching on the radio you would listen not so much to your own language as to ever new American gramophone records and British propaganda of various kinds. The time might come when in your own home country, on going to the cinema, you would see American films sold abroad—and not those of better quality, but those manufactured in greater numbers, circulated and imposed abroad by the agents of powerful cinema companies which grew especially rich in the war years.

Can anyone really fail to note that if, on the basis of the principle of so-called "equal opportunity," local national production begins unrestricted competition with products dumped from factories in the United States or Great Britain, nothing will remain of the independence of these States, especially under post-war conditions?

Is it not clear that such an unrestricted application of the principle of "equal opportunity" in the given circumstances would mean, in practice, the veritable economic enslavement of the small States and their subjugation to the rule and will of strong, rich foreign firms, banks and industrial companies?

Is it not clear that if the "principles of equality" are applied in this way in international economic life, the smaller States will live by dictation, under orders, and following the instructions of strong foreign trusts and monopolies? Was this our goal when we fought the Fascist invaders, the Hitlerite and Japanese imperialists?

If you are still in doubt on this score, read what Senator Thomas writes in the latest issue of the *American Magazine*. He writes in this widely circulated periodical: "It is not accidental that American dollars are frequently the instrument of our foreign policy." And further: "Our policy of dollar democracy renders assistance to our foreign policy."

To explain his idea, Senator Thomas dwells in detail on a number of specific questions. He further explains why America granted the loan to England after the war, and why America should not have refused this loan. He also explains the reasons for granting the last loan to France, the existing plans for granting a big loan to China, the conditions on which a loan may be granted to Poland, and so on.

The frank Senator is highly pleased by this "dollar democracy," and believes in its unlimited success. He certainly

adheres to the principle of "equal opportunity," especially at the moment when America is experiencing a period of prosperity while many other countries are experiencing a period of post-war economic weakness.

The champions of "dollar democracy" are carried away by dreams of seizing more and more economic positions in all parts of the globe. And now quite a number of American capitalists dream of becoming masters of whole States, of instituting conditions in those States to suit themselves, by means of taking advantage to the full extent of the temporary post-war conditions which especially favour "dollar democracy." But no Government of a democratic State can be carried away by annexationist plans of this kind, if it cherishes its prestige, and if it understands what the consequences may be.

During the war the Allies regarded it as one of their chief aims to achieve a situation in which no Fascist States could exist in Europe or any other part of the globe, and that the path would be clear for the democratic States and their prosperity. This does not mean that after the war we should sympathise with those who would like to make use of their wealth and fortunes, amassed during the war, for exploiting the post-war difficulties experienced by small and war-weakened States, even though this be done on the pretext of the principle of "equal opportunity," or the "policy of dollar democracy," or generally under the aegis of some annexationist plans—even if embellished with nice words.

3. Two Methods in International Relations

As to the Danube problem, it should not be solved in a hurry. This question should be treated seriously, and in occupying ourselves with it we should not confine ourselves to beautiful formulas about "equal opportunity," which in practice will be hard on many nations if we permit such principles to be carried out without any restriction, relying only on moderation of the appetites of the groups and States concerned.

But gentlemen, if we admit that this view is correct, a different method is needed in solving such important problems as that of the navigation regime on the Danube, and—which is the main thing—a different method is needed in the treatment of small States, including also the small vanquished States. The small vanquished States should also be treated decently, and this is all the more true when dealing with our small friends among the Allied States. But what is happening in reality, what manners in this respect do we encounter at the present time?

The other day an official representative of the United States spoke in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

Organisation about the river ships seized by the American occupation authorities in the upper stream of the Danube. This representative stated that the Danube fleet—comprising 800 ships belonging to Allied and former enemy countries, seized by the American authorities on the Danube—would continue to remain in the hands of the American authorities in the future. Those ships include 168 Yugoslav, 48 Czechoslovak and over 300 Hungarian ships. Those ships could now be of great use, were they restored to their lawful owners.

But the United States refuse to restore these ships even to the Allied countries, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, openly stating that this is done to force the Danube States to comply with certain American demands. Until now, far from restoring to Hungary ships seized by the American authorities on the Danube, the United States has not returned even the equipment of a number of important Hungarian factories, rolling-stock, cattle and other Hungarian property which was carried away by Szalasi's men and the Germans from Hungary, and which landed in the American occupation zone. One cannot agree with such methods of treating small States.

What, in fact, is the situation? The Danube States don't want non-Danubian States to establish their own regime on the Danube, in the Danube States' own home countries. This would seem perfectly natural. In reply, mighty Powers which have nothing to do with the Danube, resort to every means of pressure to compel the Danube States to surrender their lawful rights. Are these methods of pressure, coercion and intimidation worthy of democratic States? Do they conform with the aspiration for a democratic peace?

We are told here that the Economic Committee of the Conference by eight votes to five took a decision on convoking a Danube conference, and that all the eight votes belonged to countries far removed from the Danube, while the dissentients were the Danube States. It would seem that the convocation of a Danube conference ought to be the affair of the Danube States themselves, and there is no reason to fear that this would prejudice the interests of the Allies, or of any other State in general. Yet they refused to reckon with this, as they also refused to reckon with the fact that the convocation of such a conference is as yet quite untimely.

Nevertheless, they want to impose the convocation of a conference of definite composition on the Danube problem, making use for this purpose of a grouping of votes that has been formed here against the votes of all the Danube States. Is this correct? Does this method conform to democratic principles, or to the establishment of a democratic peace? By no means. We certainly cannot agree with such methods.

The facts I have cited demonstrate what incorrect manners and what impermissible methods are being resorted to against the small States at the present Conference. Yet we fail to hear any voices of protest against this from the professed defenders of the small States, when the interests of the small democracies on the Danube are in question. For instance, the Australian and certain other delegations have come out more than once at the Conference, claiming to defend the rights of small States. However, when the United States and Great Britain began exerting pressure on the small Danube States, the Australian, as well as certain other delegations, seemed not to notice what was taking place. Perhaps they like such treatment of the small States—but the Soviet Union does not.

The Soviet Union regards these methods of influencing small States as impermissible. The Soviet Union will insist on human treatment of the small States. We should not permit strong Powers, which to-day have many dollars or pounds in their pockets, to have an opportunity of dictating their will to other States without hindrance, to prescribe whatever they like right and left. This policy will not yield good results, but will encounter legitimate resistance from other big and small States.

This policy is doomed to failure, not to mention the fact that it is already suffering one grave moral and political defeat after another. In any case the Soviet Union, as well as many other countries, will never agree with such behaviour, such ways of building international relations. Let those who possess many dollars use them for a good purpose—let us say, in case of need, for the elimination of unemployment and for other requirements of their own States, as well as for developing normal trade relations with other countries.

We cannot, however, sympathise with one strong Power or another trying to exploit its temporary advantages at a time when many countries have not yet healed their war wounds, and when they still face such serious hardships of the transitional period of the post-war years. And it is especially impermissible for strong Powers to behave aggressively towards the small countries, or to resort to the method of pressure and unscrupulous imposition of their will on other States.

Two diametrically opposite methods exist in international life. One of them, well-known to everybody from times long past, is that of violence and domination, for which all means of pressure are good. The other method—true, not sufficiently widespread as yet—is the method of democratic co-operation based on recognition of the principle of equality and the legitimate interest of all States, big and small. We do not doubt that despite all obstacles the method of democratic co-operation among countries will gain the upper hand in the end.

Now that we have achieved victory over Hitlerite Germany and imperialist Japan, as well as over their allies, all the countries which were drawn into the whirlpool of war have many important affairs on their hands, and still have many unsolved problems. Yet the nations are not inactive. Some States have more or less recovered or are recovering from the war, while others have not yet recovered and have only now tackled this matter in the right way.

But, gentlemen, we should not doubt that life has furnished the democratic countries, even the youngest of them, with enough examples to help them find the correct path for restoring their losses, increasing their economic resources and ensuring the stable welfare of their peoples.

We should not permit any external forces to hinder this; and the rights of the peoples, won in grave and sometimes self-sacrificing-struggle, should not be violated. Then all the democratic countries will develop their strength to the full, will prove their worth in the great deeds of their peoples, and we shall all rejoice in their success.

XV

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND THE SMALL COUNTRIES

Speech at the Plenary Session, October 14, 1946

BY considering the draft peace treaty with Finland the Conference is concluding its deliberations. Now the general results of the Paris Conference can already be seen.

1. Results of the Work of the Conference

The present Conference has been a first experiment in the broad collaboration of the nations in establishing the peace following the Second World War.

The representatives of big and small States have met here to examine the peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. These peace treaties should contribute to establishing durable peace in Europe. To fulfil this purpose they should conform to the interests of the nations which desire stable and lasting peace as well as resistance to every attempt at new aggression.

This means that they should pursue the aims of a democratic peace, which is based on recognition of the aggressor's responsibility for his crimes, but not on a feeling of revenge against the vanquished, and which should to the greatest possible extent help to ensure the security of the nations and to rally them against the forces of any possible new aggression.

The Conference was preceded by the rather prolonged work of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four Great Powers. During this preparatory period, the main issues of the peace treaties were considered; alterations of the frontiers of States were outlined insofar as there were disputed issues in this respect; reparations claims were examined, although this work was not completed; military restrictions were established for the vanquished States, and so forth.

Agreed decisions were adopted by the four Governments on all these issues. However, there remained certain problems which were not settled in the preparatory stage and were referred to the Peace Conference for consideration. The Conference was to express its opinion both on questions on which agreement had been reached and on all the others. What is now the result of the Conference?

It transpires that questions which had been agreed upon by the four Great Powers received the approval of the Conference of 21 States as well. The changes made by the Conference in this case did not violate the preliminary understanding, except in regard to the statute of Trieste. The discussion at the Conference merely confirmed that these sections of the treaties fully meet the purposes of a democratic peace, if one reckons with the need for inevitable compromises in questions of this kind.

Thus, we were able to convince ourselves that when the Powers which bore the brunt of the war against our common enemy act jointly and take agreed decisions, they, as a rule, express the will of the overwhelming majority of democratic countries and meet the purpose of establishing a democratic peace. This is the positive result of the Conference's work.

The situation is different in regard to those articles of the treaties on which preliminary accord had not been reached. This refers to a group of economic articles, the problem of the statute of Trieste, the navigation regime on the Danube and certain other problems. The results of the work of the Conference in this latter respect do not resemble the results of the discussion on these problems agreed upon by the four powers.

One might have expected that it would be in regard to problems on which accord had not been reached beforehand that the work of the Conference would be particularly useful. In reality, however, the situation was different. These problems proved to be inadequately prepared by the Council of four Ministers. The Conference failed to find ways to eliminate the differences which had previously arisen. And, as was proved by experience, the group which dominated the Conference, beginning with the United States and Britain, did not even desire to do so. They relied on the secure support of the majority of

the delegations and sought to make use of this situation in order to make their view prevail.

These calculations, however, were not justified. Nor could they have been justified, since at international conferences, when the equality of all participants is observed, nothing can be obtained by building up a mechanical majority and by disregarding the legitimate interests of other countries, which do not belong to this majority. The dominating group proved once more that it did not want to seek an agreement acceptable to all the participants of the Conference. The result is well known.

The results of the Conference's work cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Treaty articles which had not been agreed upon before the Conference remained, in most cases, unagreed. One should have remembered, however, that international conferences do not gather in order to demonstrate differences but in order to find possibilities for achieving agreed opinions by various parties and for working out joint decisions.

The minority, on the other hand, exerted every effort to explain its viewpoint and to call the others to normal co-operation. This, as we hope, should not remain futile. All this places on the Council of Foreign Ministers the major responsibility for the final decisions on which the signing of the treaties will depend.

2. Reasons for Unsatisfactory Results

From the above it is clear what is the main reason for the unsatisfactory results of the Conference's work in regard to a considerable number of problems. From the very outset, and until the end of the Conference, we have observed efforts on the part of a definite group of delegations to hold a dominant position and to dictate its decisions without any regard for the opinion of a considerable number of other delegations.

This was done in various ways, and at times this method created a rather embarrassing situation for the delegations of small countries. One could have expected that the initiative of the small States would have facilitated agreement at this Conference. But did this actually happen? In reality, the delegations of the small States were not infrequently compelled merely to trail in the wake of the dominant trend, in the wake of the majority.

Take the Danube problem, or, in other words, the question of including into the peace treaties with the Balkan countries a decision on the convocation of a conference composed of representatives of definite States to consider the problem of Danube navigation, a decision against which all the Danube States objected. No recommendation was adopted on this point

at the meeting of the Economic Committee, since no proposal gathered two-thirds of the votes, as required by the procedure of the Committee's work.

The voting at the plenary session yielded a majority of 14 votes against seven in favour of the convocation of such a conference. India, Ethiopia and certain other States proved to be among those 14. It would seem that, in regard to the Danube problem, these States could have adopted a more objective, more sober-minded and more reasonable attitude towards the Danube States. Yet this did not happen.

Why, indeed, had India to insist on the settling of these problems, for instance in the peace treaty with Rumania? What interests of India, what interests of Indians, are affected by the convocation of a Danube conference of one or other kind, on which Britain and the United States so strongly insist? Certainly the leader of the Indian delegation, Sir Samuel Ranganadan, might have expressed for some reason of his own the opinion that the Indian delegation was deeply interested in this problem and was bound necessarily to insist upon a decision on the Danube with which no single Danubian State at the Conference could agree.

Everyone of us, however, understands that if this had been the voice of independent India, if we had been confronted with the voice of a representative of real India, as demanded by all honest democrats throughout the world, we could have expected more objective voting on the part of India, whereas now we have been again confronted with an impermissible situation, in which the Indian delegation merely performed its colonial duty of voting at the will of another country—at the will of Great Britain. The time is not far remote, however, when other and happier days will come for India!

Or take another question. By an overwhelming majority of votes, including those of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, the Political Committee for Bulgaria approved the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers to preserve the present Bulgaro-Greek frontier, which conforms to the interests of a stable peace in Europe. At the plenary session of the Conference, however, the British delegate, contrary to his voting in the Committee and still earlier in the Council of Foreign Ministers, headed a majority of delegations which possessed twelve votes, and abstained from voting when the proposal on preserving the present Bulgaro-Greek frontier intact was put to the vote.

As a result of this, the Conference did not take any decision on this subject. This means that, by the votes of mainly small States, Britain achieved a decision at the plenary session which

by no means conforms to the interests of a stable peace, but can only serve as an impetus for adventures and aggression.

The question arises whether such voting is in the national interests of Ethiopia, Belgium, Brazil, India, Holland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, China or, lastly, even Greece herself, which, together with Britain, abstained from voting on this question? Is not this combination of delegations a kind of playing with votes which, however, no honest democrat and no unbiased person in general can fail to regard as a gross political blunder, prejudicing the cause of a stable peace, and advantageous only to those who sow uneasiness and new aggression?

This voting combination cast doubt on the whole practice of voting at this Conference. And yet, beyond any doubt, the Council of Foreign Ministers will again approve its previous decision on the stability of the Bulgaro-Greek frontier, which will constitute a condemnation of the artificial combination of the 12 votes of those who abstained at the plenary session of the Conference.

The political playing with votes in the matter of the Bulgaro-Greek frontier will by no means meet the approval of public opinion in democratic countries. The miscalculation made in this political game is obvious. That is why we confidently tell the Bulgarians—our friends: "Bulgarians, rest easy, your frontier will remain unshakable."

To explain the reason for the unsatisfactory progress of the Conference, one should recall how many problems were discussed here. We who formed the minority felt it our duty to explain our views on all important problems, we made many attempts to appeal to the sense of impartiality, to the interests of co-operation.

We believe that a study of these pronouncements will be useful, since one should think not only of the delegates of the Conference, but also of those millions of people who watch attentively everything going on in the Luxembourg Palace. Yet at the Conference even the most weighty arguments proved little effective. The method of persuasion was neither successful nor popular where, say, the British or American delegation disagreed with one or other opinion.

Regardless of whether a certain proposal was right or wrong, it secured the majority guaranteed to the Anglo-American bloc if it suited a definite group. For some reason, things at the Conference were arranged in such a way that, contrary to the order of the alphabet, the delegate of the United States was the first to vote, and from the very outset, by his "no," he definitely

set the tune in regard to all the proposals made by the minority. This certainly facilitated the position of a definite group, but it failed to enhance the prestige of the Conference decisions.

Make a check-up, and you will see that throughout the Conference the Soviet delegation did not renounce a single one of its views expressed before the Conference and reflected in the agreed decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact that the three other members of the Foreign Ministers' Council twice renounced their views expressed in the agreed decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

It is known that, as regards procedure, the British, American and French delegations renounced here the stand they took in the Council of Foreign Ministers. It seemed more convenient to them to rely, not only on a majority of two-thirds of the votes, as is usual at international conferences, but on a simple majority—evidently so that the dominating group at the Conference should feel perfectly comfortable and certain at all and every voting.

It is also well known that on the subject of the statute of Trieste those three delegations also renounced their view agreed upon by the four Ministers in the Council of Foreign Ministers, and prevailed on the Conference to take decisions which contradict the democratic principles of the statute of Trieste recognised by the Council of Ministers. These examples also prove that not much concern was displayed about the authority of the Conference.

This, gentlemen, is how matters stand in regard to the results of the work of the Conference. As a consequence the value of many of the recommendations passed by the Conference was impaired. The entire progress of the Conference's work, and the wrong voting procedure accepted by it, resulted in a decline in the authority of the recommendations adopted by the Conference.

3. *Attitude to Small Countries*

As a result of all this, we are bound to give serious attention to the principles of post-war co-operation between big and small States in order to prevent any possible adverse consequences of the violation of universally recognised democratic principles in this field.

Apart from those good things accomplished by the Conference which I mentioned at the beginning, it has given quite a few examples of how co-operation between big and small States should not be arranged if we are really imbued with the spirit of democratic co-operation among the nations. In this connec-

tion I want to dwell on the problem of Finland, and on the policy of the Great Powers in regard to small countries.

The policy of the Soviet Union in regard to Finland is clear. It is determined by the democratic principles on which the U.S.S.R. bases its attitude towards small countries.

The Soviet Union has always sought to establish friendly relations with its small neighbour, Finland. It proved impossible to achieve this before the war, since Finland was ruled by a clique of reactionaries, including reactionary "Socialists" of the type of Tanner, now convicted by a Finnish court together with other war criminals. This clique involved Finland in alliance with Hitler Germany and then in war against the U.S.S.R., in which Finland played a disgraceful part in besieging glorious Soviet Leningrad.

Yet, despite this, when the Soviet Army routed the German and Finnish troops which were besieging Leningrad, and victoriously advanced northward from Leningrad, the Soviet Union agreed to magnanimous Armistice terms, and on its own initiative refused to send Soviet troops to the territory of Finland. This made the Armistice terms considerably easier for Finland, which, unlike all the other satellites of Germany, was spared great expenditure for the maintenance of occupation troops.

After the end of the war, Finland freely chose a democratic path of development, and since then has been treading her own road, observing a policy of good-neighbourly relations with the U.S.S.R. In this case the Soviet Union, as on all other occasions, never interfered in Finland's domestic affairs and exerted no pressure on those affairs; and whenever Finland applied to the U.S.S.R., the latter rendered her the necessary practical assistance and facilitated as far as possible the execution of the Armistice terms. On her part, Finland honestly discharged her reparation and other obligations to the U.S.S.R.

The draft peace treaty with Finland provides only for those absolutely indispensable obligations which had already earlier been provided by the Armistice terms, and the magnanimity of which cannot be denied by any impartial person. Certainly a departure from these conditions cannot be allowed.

As to the policy of the other Great Powers in regard to Finland, the situation here is somewhat different. Senator Vandenberg's speech to-day confirms this and leaves a very unfavourable impression as regards the consistency and sincerity of the views which he expressed. The American delegate assumed the pose of Finland's well-wisher, and made a statement which means nothing more nor less than thwarting the Armistice terms signed by Finland on the one hand, and by the Soviet Union and Great Britain on the other.

Two years have elapsed since these Armistice terms were signed, but never in all this time did the United States declare its disagreement with those terms. It is only to-day that Senator Vandenberg, displaying courage of a special kind, came forward on behalf of the United States of America against the basic terms of the Armistice with Finland.

The American delegate plunged here into a policy of open wooing of a small country, pretending that this wooing means concern for Finland's interests. Yet such methods in regard to small countries have long been known and cannot appear new to any one of us. It is interesting that even somewhat earlier the British delegation also displayed peculiar attention to Finland. It was only in regard to Finland that Great Britain agreed to the Soviet Union's proposal not to take and not to liquidate the assets of that country abroad, although both Great Britain and the United States demand the taking away and liquidation of foreign assets of Hungary and Bulgaria and Rumania, despite all objections and requests on the part of the Soviet delegation that they refrain from these excessive claims against small countries.

Thus the United States and Great Britain adopted a certain policy in regard to some of the small States and a different policy in regard to Finland. And these attempts to display a peculiar kind of goodwill in regard to Finland are made in such a way as to lead to opposing Finland to her neighbour, the Soviet Union.

In the past, too, we had occasion to face such methods in the foreign policies of certain States. Before the war we witnessed numerous facts of this kind, especially in regard to small countries which are neighbours of the Soviet Union.

It is well-known what consequences followed from the wooing of Finnish reactionary circles by the great Powers. At that time the Finnish reactionaries imagined that everything was permitted to them. The end of it was that Finland concluded an alliance with Hitler and plunged into adventurist war against the Soviet Union. Having become a plaything in the hands of German Fascism, Finland incurred tremendous losses in the last two wars against the U.S.S.R.

Certain reactionaries are fond of this political game with small countries, particularly, if this satisfies their desire to cause damage, in one way or another, to the Soviet Union. We believe, however, that the Finns have drunk the bitter cup to its dregs, and have already learned to distinguish true friends from bad advisers who pursue their own narrow aims.

One thing is clear: true co-operation between big and small countries can only rest on an honest and democratic foundation.

Playing at friendship can now have no success with nations which have experienced grave trials. On the other hand, however, there should be no doubt that true friendship between nations is a great force of our times.

4. *The Principle Underlying Co-operation*

At present an offensive is in progress against the main principles of co-operation among big and small States embodied in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. This offensive is being waged under the slogan of struggle against the so-called right of veto belonging to the Great Powers in the Security Council. In reality, however, this is an expression of the pressure of the reactionary circles of certain Great Powers, who have imagined themselves masters of the world; who seek to impose their will on all nations and who, in the attempt to clear away all obstacles from this road, want to abolish the principles of co-operation of nations established by the United Nations Organisation.

It now becomes ever clearer how they wish to achieve this. Recently Australia and Cuba placed on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations proposals aimed at destroying the foundation on which the United Nations Organisation rests. They show special concern, if you please, in abolishing the principle of unanimity of the five Great Powers in deciding basic questions of the peace and security of Nations, as required by the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. There are more involved in this than Australia and Cuba, who are unable to do anything independently in such matters.

An attack against the principle of unity of action of the Great Powers has now been launched by M. Spaak, too, who has forgotten that this is a peculiarly inappropriate role for the President of the General Assembly, who ought to uphold the Charter of the United Nations Organisation instead of destroying it.

We know that some politicians do not find it so very difficult to adapt themselves to reactionary circles. But if one bears in mind that the future does not belong to these forces, one should not doubt that the principles of the democratic co-operation of nations, which unite big and small countries in the interests of universal peace and security—that these principles will triumph over each and every machination of the reactionaries. The Soviet Union is true to its programme of struggle for stable peace and security, and defends the principles of honest co-operation among nations.

You heard, lately, the calm and firm voice of the great Stalin, which resounded throughout the world. The head of the Soviet

Government, Stalin, said that he unquestionably believes in the possibility of friendly and lasting co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, despite the existence of ideological differences, and also believes in "friendly competition" between the two systems. Such is the general line of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

This policy is not new. As early as November 6, 1944, when the Allies were waging a struggle against Hitler Germany and imperialist Japan, the great leader of the land of Soviets, Stalin, spoke of the creation of the United Nations Organisation: "Can we expect the actions of this world organisation to be sufficiently effective? They will be effective if the Great Powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated."

At that time these statements seemed perfectly indisputable to all of us. In not a single democratic country was any objection raised to this statement of the head of the Soviet Government.

But the war has gone. The Soviet Army has performed its epoch-making feat. New sentiments have appeared. Attempts are now being made to turn matters another way. It is sometimes sought to use even the Peace Conference in the interests of a definite dominant group, and evidently even to adapt the United Nations Organisation to such purposes.

We shall not render any assistance in these attempts. The Soviet Union will resist every attempt to deflect the United Nations Organisation from its main path; from the road of arranging the co-operation of the peace-loving countries in conformity with the aims of the general security of the nations.

The Soviet Union is for the co-operation of all peoples, for co-operation between big and small powers based on the principles of equality and recognition of the legitimate interests of big and small States. Such are the principles of democratic co-operation between the peoples, and we shall to the end remain true to the defence of these principles. And we know that this is the only correct policy.

FINAL REMARKS

At the Closing Plenary Session, October 15, 1946


THE Soviet delegation supports with great satisfaction the resolutions which have just now been read expressing gratitude to M. Bidault and the Government of France for their excellent hospitality, and gratitude to the Secretary-General and all members of the staff of the present Conference, who have rendered tremendous help to us during the intensive work that has been going on here. The Soviet delegation would only desire to express this great and sincere gratitude as eloquently and convincingly as possible.

We have heard a speech devoted to the importance of the work of the present Conference. Each one of us cannot fail to think of this at the present moment. And not only are those who are present here pondering to-day over the results of the work of the present Conference, but also those who are outside these walls and of whom there is a far greater number than of us sitting in this hall. In doing so they recall the grave war years, the crimes of Fascism, the hardships and trials of the struggle in those last years, when the desire of the nations for establishment of a genuinely stable and durable peace and security of nations after the Second World War grew so greatly.

The Soviet delegation represents a country which has made her contribution to the cause of our common victory. We know that this contribution of the U.S.S.R. has met with the widest recognition among all the Allied and associated nations as a great deed in securing the rout of the enemy and the liberation of the nations from the Fascism that sprang up after the First World War.

Now, when the Allies are busy with establishing the peace and security of the peoples, the Soviet Union which we here represent deems in its duty to continue the struggle for those aims for which we fought during the war. We are convinced that the struggle we are waging for a democratic peace—that this struggle conforms to the most important interests of the peoples of the big and small countries, meets the vital interests of all the peace-loving nations. We are waging this struggle although certain people do not like it in certain cases, we are waging it for the sake of a democratic peace, for the sake of ensuring the security of the nations in deeds and not in words. We Soviet people are loyal to this great cause, and we shall wage this struggle with all the persistence and vigour of which we are capable, guided by a sense of duty towards our people.

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V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and head of the Soviet Delegation, addressing the Peace Conference in Paris